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NOT “SPECIAL” ENOUGH FOR CHAPTER 7: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
PROVISION OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 
ROMA PEREZ* 
ABSTRACT 
The “special circumstances” provision of the Bankruptcy Code, Section 
707(b)(2)(B), allows a consumer debtor to rebut the presumption of abuse 
that is triggered when debtor fails the means test. Congress enacted the 
statute as a procedural safeguard fully aware that means testing, as set-out 
in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005, could lead to arbitrary results for some debtors. For consumer 
debtors, the provision functions as a type of escape-hatch. It allows a 
debtor to avoid dismissal of his Chapter 7 bankruptcy case by introducing 
documentary evidence that the means test calculation, and its attendant 
income and expense figures, is not representative of the debtor’s financial 
reality. The provision itself, however, offers courts little guidance on what 
is sufficient to constitute a “special circumstance.” Bankruptcy courts, 
therefore, are split on how strictly the statute should be interpreted. A 
number of courts construe the provision so strictly that they essentially 
require that debtor prove “extraordinary” circumstances before the court 
will allow an adjustment of debtor’s income or expense figures for means 
testing. As a result, the only safeguard that was put in place to protect 
debtors is broken. Honest debtors for whom the means test does not 
accurately yield their repayment capacity may be denied the benefit of a 
Chapter 7 discharge and its attendant financial fresh start. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 20, 2005, President George W. Bush signed into law the Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA), the most 
comprehensive amendments to the federal bankruptcy code since the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978.1 Since the enactment of BAPCPA, the “means test” has 
functioned as the proverbial gatekeeper to Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief for consumer 
debtors.2 A debtor is foreclosed from going forward with his Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
case if his income is above the state’s median income and the means test calculation 
shows that the debtor has at least $207.92, and in some cases as little as $124.59, of 
monthly disposable income which can be used to pay unsecured creditors.3 In such 
cases, the means test triggers a presumption of abuse—a conclusion that debtor’s 
bankruptcy case is an abuse of the bankruptcy process—and the debtor’s case must 
be dismissed.4 A debtor wanting to continue in Chapter 7 only has one option: to 
prove “special circumstances” pursuant to Section 707(b)(2)(B) of the bankruptcy 
code.5  
                                                            
 1 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), Pub. 
L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.); Susan 
Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 485 (2005) (“Although [BAPCPA’s] genesis can be 
traced to the formation of a commission charged by Congress with a modest mandate to 
review the state of the bankruptcy law system, the end product represents one of the most 
comprehensive overhauls of the Bankruptcy Code in more than twenty-five years.”); Remarks 
on Signing the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 41 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 641-42 (Apr. 25, 2005), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
granule/WCPD-2005-04-25/WCPD-2005-04-25-Pg641/content-detail.html. 
 2 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(1)-(b)(2) (West 2013); see generally Marianne B. Culhane & 
Michaela M. White, Catching Can-Pay Debtors: Is the Means Test the Only Way?, 13 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 665, 665 (2005) (noting that the “means test guards the gates of chapter 
7”). 
 3 Id. § 707 (b)(2)(A)(i) (“In considering under paragraph (1) whether the granting of relief 
would be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall presume abuse exists if the 
debtor’s current monthly income reduced by the amounts determined under clauses (ii), (iii), 
and (iv), and multiplied by 60 is not less than the lesser of—(I) 25 percent of the debtor’s 
nonpriority unsecured claims in the case, or $7,475, whichever is greater; or (II) $12,475.”). 
 4 A debtor subject to the presumption of abuse may also choose to convert his case to a 
case under chapter 11 or 13 of the bankruptcy code. Id. § 707(b)(1) (“After notice and a 
hearing, the court . . . may dismiss a case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter 
whose debts are primarily consumer debts, or, with the debtor’s consent, convert such a case 
to a case under chapter 11 or 13 of this title, if it finds that the granting of relief would be an 
abuse of the provisions of this chapter.”). 
 5 Id. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) (“In any proceeding brought under this subsection, the 
presumption of abuse may only be rebutted by demonstrating special circumstances.”); In re 
Rieck, 427 B.R. 141, 146 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2010) (“There is only one way to rebut the 
presumption of abuse . . . [a] debtor must demonstrate ‘special circumstances.’”). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss4/6
2013] NOT “SPECIAL” ENOUGH FOR CHAPTER 7 985 
 
Although much has been written about the means test, there has been relatively 
little analysis of the bankruptcy code’s “special circumstances” provision even eight 
years after the enactment of BAPCPA.6 Yet, for the debtor facing the inevitable 
dismissal of his Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, the special circumstances provision can 
mean the difference between obtaining the bankruptcy relief debtor desires, having 
to pursue a different form of bankruptcy relief, such as a Chapter 13 case, or having 
to forgo bankruptcy relief altogether. This provision is significant, not only because 
of its importance to the debtor, but also because it was intended to function as a 
procedural safeguard to ensure that debtors with little or no ability to pay their 
unsecured creditors are not wrongfully denied Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief as a result 
of formulaic means testing.7 Through this provision, Congress recognized and 
anticipated that the means test calculation, although straightforward, could produce 
arbitrary results not in line with the reality of a debtor’s financial situation.8  
In practice, however, the special circumstances provision is not functioning as 
the procedural safeguard that it was intended to be.9 Some courts have been overly 
strict in their interpretation and application of the provision, in effect, creating a 
standard that requires the debtor prove the existence of “extraordinary” 
circumstances in order to rebut the presumption of abuse triggered by the means 
test.10 That standard is not only contrary to the plain language of the statute, but 
                                                            
 6 See generally Jason J. Kilborn, Still Chasing Chimeras but Finally Slaying Some 
Dragons in the Quest for Consumer Bankruptcy Reform, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 4 
(2012) (discussing the creditor lobbies’ role in the 2005 bankruptcy reform and concluding 
that BAPCPA has been a “spectacular failure” in curbing bankruptcy abuse or achieving any 
of its objectives); Mark A. Neal & Sandra Manocchio, Means Testing: The Heart of BAPCPA, 
40 MD. BAR JOURNAL 26 (2007); Robert J. Landry III & Nancy Hisey Mardis, Consumer 
Bankruptcy Reform: Debtors’ Prison Without Bars or “Just Desserts” for Deadbeats?, 36 
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 91 (2006) (summarizing and discussing some of the most drastic 
amendments to the bankruptcy code as a result of BAPCPA). 
 7 See In re Edwards, No. 12-00603-TOM-7, 2012 WL 3042233, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 
July 25, 2012) (“Congress recognized the need to avoid ‘rigid and arbitrary application’ of the 
means test and thus included in the statute a provision allowing debtors to demonstrate 
‘special circumstances, such as a serious medical condition or a call or order to active duty in 
the Armed Forces, to the extent such special circumstances justify additional expenses or 
adjustments of current monthly income for which there is no reasonable alternative’ as a 
means of rebutting the presumption of abuse.”); In re Stocker, 399 B.R. 522, 531 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 2008) (“The ‘special circumstances’ exception [to the means test presumption that 
debtor’s chapter 7 filing is abusive] was intended to ‘protect debtors from rigid and arbitrary 
application of a means test.’”); S. REP. NO. 106-49, at 8 (1999) (referring to the special 
circumstances provision as a “procedural safeguard” meant to “ensure that the individual 
circumstances of each bankrupt will be considered before he or she is dismissed or converted 
to chapter 13”). 
 8 See In re Edwards, 2012 WL 3042233, at *4; In re Stocker, 399 B.R. at 522; S. REP. NO. 
106-49, at 6-7 (“In order to protect debtors from rigid and arbitrary application of a means-test 
. . . in some cases where the presumption [of abuse] applies the debtor may be able to 
demonstrate ‘special circumstances’ that justify additional expenses or an adjustment to 
debtor’s income.”). 
 9 See infra Part III. 
 10 In re Smith, 436 B.R. 476, 481 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010) (requiring debtor to show a 
“sudden or catastrophic event”); In re Burggraf, 436 B.R. 466, 472 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010) 
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clearly conflicts with Congress’s intent in enacting the special circumstances 
provision.11 Furthermore, this interpretation of the statutory language creates an 
almost insurmountable evidentiary burden for the debtor even in cases where it is 
evident that the means test does not accurately yield debtor’s true repayment 
capacity.12 Because this provision is the only recourse that allows the debtor to rebut 
the statutory presumption of abuse, its overly strict interpretation or 
misinterpretation by the courts essentially removes the only safeguard that protects 
the debtor from an inequitable application of the means test and, consequently, 
unfairly forecloses the debtor from the possibility of obtaining a Chapter 7 
discharge. 
This article examines the special circumstances provision, Section 707(b)(2)(B) 
of the Bankruptcy Code, and concludes that the courts have interpreted this 
provision too strictly and too variably for it to properly function as the procedural 
safeguard that Congress envisioned. Part II of this Article briefly discusses the 
means test and analyzes the inherent inequities in the test that require that there be a 
workable safeguard in place to protect honest consumer debtors. Part III of this 
Article will examine the interpretation given to the special circumstances provision 
by the courts. It will explain how some courts’ interpretation of Section 707(b)(2)(B) 
has created what essentially amounts to an irrefutable presumption of abuse that 
leaves some debtors, that have little or no ability to repay their debts, unable to 
obtain a Chapter 7 discharge and a fresh start. Finally, Part IV of this Article 
recommends that courts take a more moderate approach to their interpretation of the 
special circumstances standard to ensure that honest debtors are not unfairly 
foreclosed from continuing in Chapter 7 by a rigid mathematical calculation that is 
not representative of debtor’s true financial condition. 
                                                            
(noting that debtor must establish that circumstances are “extraordinary” or “exceptional”); In 
re Stocker, 399 B.R. at 522 (noting that the factors giving rise to additional expenses or 
adjustments of income must be “extraordinary or exceptional, are unexpected or involuntary, 
and place the debtor in dire need of Chapter 7 relief”); In re Parulan, 387 B.R. 168, 170 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008); In re Pageau, 383 B.R. 221, 226 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2008); In re Witek, 
383 B.R. 323, 329 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007). 
 11 S. REP. NO. 106-49 (1999); see infra Part III.A. 
 12 In re Chambers, No. 10-00856-als7, 2011 WL 4479690 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa June 7, 
2011) (post-petition job change and decrease in income due to loss of overtime not considered 
a “special circumstance”); In re Wise, No. 10-32441, 2011 WL 2133843 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. May 
27, 2011) (loss of child support payments shortly post-petition not a “special circumstance” 
even though it would decrease debtor’s CMI and disposable income); In re Pignotti, No. 07-
04109-lmj7, 2011 WL 1299616 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Apr. 1, 2011) (high transportation cost due 
to debtor’s long commute to and from work not a “special circumstance” requiring adjustment 
of allowable expenses); In re Siler, 426 B.R. 167 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2010) (debtor’s 
repayment obligation on non-dischargeable student loan not a “special circumstances” absent 
any evidence in the record to indicate loan was necessary due to unforeseen injury or 
disability); In re Cotto, 425 B.R. 72 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010) (one-time pre-petition wage 
settlement raising debtor’s CMI considerably not a “special circumstance” despite non-
recurring nature of payment).  
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II. THE “SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES PROVISION: A NECESSARY MECHANISM TO 
SAFEGUARD THE CONSUMER DEBTOR FROM THE INEQUITIES OF MEANS TESTING 
The special circumstances provision of the Bankruptcy Code, Section 
707(b)(2)(B), must be understood in the context of the means test and the goals that 
Congress sought to achieve when it implemented means testing as the threshold to 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief. The provision itself functions as an “out” for the above-
median debtor for whom the means test calculation triggers a presumption of 
abuse.13 It is the only mechanism that will allow the debtor to prove to the 
bankruptcy court that there are unique circumstances in debtor’s financial life, 
outside of what is reflected in the numerical figures of the test, that the court must 
consider when assessing debtor’s means.14 It allows a debtor to rebut the abuse 
presumption and continue his bankruptcy case by proving that debtor’s particular 
circumstances are “special” and require a mathematical adjustment to the “current 
monthly income” (CMI) figure or expense figures of the means test.15 The debtor 
must then prove that the adjustments are sufficient to reduce the debtor’s disposable 
income below the statutory amount.16 Only then may the debtor continue his Chapter 
7 bankruptcy case.17  
Accordingly, it is essential to understand whom Congress sought to exclude from 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief through the implementation of means testing in order to 
determine what types of debtors Congress sought to protect through the special 
circumstances provision and under what circumstances Congress wanted to ensure 
that those debtors could continue with their Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. Moreover, an 
analysis of the means test calculation reveals that the test is flawed and that, in some 
instances, because of how the income and expense figures of the test are calculated, 
the test will yield a disposable income amount that is greater than what would 
actually be available to debtor to fund a Chapter 13 repayment plan.18 In those 
situations, the result of the means test formula is a financial fiction on which it 
would be unfair and inequitable to base the dismissal of debtor’s Chapter 7 case. 
Given the rigidity of the test, therefore, an adequate and properly functioning 
safeguard is essential in order to ensure that the honest debtor is not unjustifiably 
foreclosed from obtaining Chapter 7 relief. 
                                                            
 13 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i)-(iv) (West 2013) (“[T]he presumption of abuse may only 
be rebutted by demonstrating special circumstances.”). 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 In re Cribbs, 387 B.R. 324, 332 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2008) (noting that because the means 
test is based on historical income and expenses it was not intended to produce the most 
accurate prediction of the debtor’s actual ability to fund a chapter 13 plan); In re Miller, 361 
B.R. 224, 235 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2007); In re Walker, No. 05-15010-WHD, 2006 WL 
1314125, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 1, 2006) (noting that the means test is not an accurate 
predictor of debtor’s actual ability to pay debts in chapter 13). 
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A. A Means Test to Curtail Abuse of Bankruptcy Protection 
Among BAPCPA’s most controversial amendments to the bankruptcy code was 
the implementation of a means test—the use of a mathematical formula to identify 
debtors that, despite having filed for bankruptcy relief, have some ability to pay their 
debts.19 In the late 1990s and early 2000s when Congress was debating the bills that 
would eventually become the BAPCPA amendments, there was a strong push from 
the creditor lobbies to move the bankruptcy process for consumer debtors from one 
where it was presumed that debtors were entitled to the bankruptcy relief they 
sought, to one where debtors would have to offer concrete mathematical proof that 
they did not have any income from which to pay their creditors.20 At the time, 
Congress sought to fix a bankruptcy system that they perceived to be “in a state of 
crisis”—a system that continued to see a skyrocketing number of consumer 
bankruptcies despite the unprecedented economic prosperity of the late 1990’s which 
included decreasing unemployment rates and high wages.21 This phenomenon, 
according to Congress, was attributable to the bankruptcy code’s “generous” debt 
forgiveness provisions in Chapter 7 and the fact that debtors were no longer subject 
to the negative social stigmas that used to be associated with bankruptcy.22 These 
                                                            
 19 David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy Revolution of 2005, 15 
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 223 (2007); Landry & Mardis, supra note 6. See generally Judge 
Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time for Means-Testing, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 177 
(1999). 
 20 Hon. Nancy C. Dreher, Dismissal for Abuse and for Presumptive Abuse Under § 707(b), 
in BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL § 10:18 (2013) (noting the pre-BAPCPA presumption in favor 
of granting Chapter 7 relief to the debtor in § 707); Kilborn, supra note 6, at 4 (explaining 
how MBNA, a major credit card issuing bank, drafted the initial bankruptcy reform bill 
seeking to reduce the number of bankruptcy filings generally while identifying “can-pay” 
debtors); Kathleen Murphy & Justin H. Dion, “Means Test” or “Just a Mean Test”: An 
Examination of the Requirement that Converted Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Debtors Comply with 
Amended Section 707(B), 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 413, 416 (2008) (“Before BAPCPA 
was passed, a debtor deciding to file chapter 7 was initially presumed to be acting in good 
faith. Fueled by rising bankruptcy rates and intense lobbying from credit business, Congress 
began to presume debtors were acting in bad faith.”); Charles J. Tabb & Jillian K. McClelland, 
Living with the Means Test, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 463 (2007); Landry & Mardis, supra note 6, at 
95 (“The amendments to the Bankruptcy Code made by the enactment of BAPCPA in 2005 
arguably represent a shift away from the policy of bankruptcy law favoring debtors.”).  
 21 S. REP. NO. 106-49, at *2 (1999), 1999 WL 300934 (“Surprisingly, the explosion in 
bankruptcy comes at a time of unprecedented prosperity, with low unemployment and high 
wages.”); Kilborn, supra note 6, at 3 (“Three factors converged to push an ill-conceived and 
poorly drafted reform bill through the legislative process: (1) the ebb and flow of politics had 
moved toward a more conservative position, (2) the general economic situation (especially 
investment asset values, such as home equity and stocks) was at all-time highs, and yet (3) 
annual personal bankruptcy filings had exceeded the psychologically important one million 
mark in 1996.”).  
 22 S. REP. NO. 106-49, at *2-3 (attributing sharp rise in bankruptcy filings to a decrease in 
the moral stigma associated with filing for bankruptcy and the bankruptcy code’s “generous 
no-questions-asked policy of providing complete debt forgiveness under chapter 7 without 
serious consideration of a bankrupt’s ability to repay”); Jones & Zywicki, supra note 19, at 
180 (“[T]he evidence now available tends to suggest that the recent rise in personal 
bankruptcies has been significantly influenced by a decline in the personal shame and social 
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factors combined, Congress surmised, were fostering widespread abuse of the 
bankruptcy process by well-to-do debtors.23 These “high-income” debtors could 
actually afford to repay their creditors but, instead, would file for bankruptcy, 
discharge most if not all of their unsecured debts, and continue to enjoy their income 
unencumbered by high credit card bills and other debt.24 Supporters of implementing 
means testing as a part of the bankruptcy reform asserted that bankruptcy abuse was 
a “middle-class issue” and that the means test would only affect debtor’s that were 
“well-off” or “higher income filers” that could and should be steered into repayment 
plans rather than be allowed to discharge their unsecured debt in a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy case.25 The motivation for implementing means testing, therefore, was 
clear: to stop well-to-do debtors from continuing to wrongfully take advantage of the 
bankruptcy process and force them, if they wanted any bankruptcy relief at all, into 
Chapter 13 repayment plans where the debtor must commit all of their disposable 
income to paying unsecured creditors for the life of the plan, usually sixty-months 
(five years).26 The means test was simply a mechanism to mathematically identify or 
predict which debtors had extra income that should be used to pay creditors.27 The 
challenge, however, was to achieve this goal without preventing honest debtors, 
those that really have no significant means from which to pay creditors, from being 
able to obtain a fresh start through Chapter 7. Unfortunately, the current embodiment 
of the means test in the bankruptcy code fails to achieve these goals for several 
reasons. Primarily, the test fails to take into account changes in debtor’s financial life 
that can skew the calculation and make the debtor appear to have more disposable 
                                                            
stigma traditionally accompanying bankruptcy, and by changes in the law and legal practice 
that have facilitated filing bankruptcy.”). 
 23 S. REP. NO. 106-49; Justin H. Rucki, Looking Forward While Looking Back: Using 
Debtors’ Post-Petition Financial Changes to Find Bankruptcy Abuse After BAPCPA, 49 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 335, 350 (2007) (“The legislative history accompanying the BAPCPA makes 
clear that Congress thought that fairness to creditors was drastically lacking in the existing 
version of the Bankruptcy Code, and, as a result, Congress sought to make it significantly 
harder for consumers to get bankruptcy relief, all in the name of curbing bankruptcy abuse.”). 
 24 S. REP. NO. 106-49, at *3 (“[T]he concept of ‘means testing’ bankruptcy filers so that 
higher income filers are steered into repayment plans is the culmination of many 
Congressional efforts, by Republicans and Democrats, over 5 decades.” (emphasis added)); 
Culhane & White, supra note 2, at 671 (“The basic idea of the means test is to identify a group 
of higher-income debtors for special scrutiny .”); Jones & Zywicki, supra note 19, at 178 
(stating that means testing “embodies the concept that well-off, income-earning debtors should 
be required to repay what they can to their unsecured nonpriority creditors”). 
 25 Andrew P. MacArthur, Pay to Play: The Poor’s Problems in the BAPCPA, 25 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 407, 407 (2009) (“When Congress debated the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention 
and Consumer Protection Act (‘BAPCPA’), most senators felt that the BAPCPA was mainly 
‘a middle-class issue,’ leading to little debate involving the effects on the poor.”); Jones & 
Zywicki, supra note 19, at 184 (“The only effect of means-testing is to prohibit well-to-do 
debtors who can make some repayment from walking away and sticking creditors and other 
consumers with the bill.” (emphasis added)). 
 26 Rucki, supra note 23; Culhane & White, supra note 2.  
 27 S. REP. NO.106-49; Jones & Zywicki, supra note 19. 
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income than would actually be available to pay creditors.28 If the debtor is unable to 
use the special circumstances provision of the code to account for those changes, the 
debtor may be forced to forgo bankruptcy relief based on a calculation that does not 
accurately evidence debtor’s repayment capacity. 
B. The Myth that is “Current Monthly Income” and Other Inequities Created by the 
Means Test 
Part of the problem is created by the means test calculation itself. The test is 
designed to be a “snapshot” of the debtor’s finances on the petition date.29 The 
formula is straightforward and fairly easy to apply. It measures a debtor’s 
“disposable income,” the amount the debtor could pay unsecured creditors over the 
life of a Chapter 13 plan, by subtracting from debtor’s “current monthly income,” or 
CMI, certain allowable expenses enumerated in the bankruptcy code.30 Abuse is 
presumed and debtor’s Chapter 7 case must be dismissed or, at debtor’s option, 
converted to a Chapter 13 case, if the debtor is an above-median debtor and has at 
least $207.92 or more in monthly disposable income after subtracting the allowable 
expenses from debtor’s CMI.31 For some debtors, a disposable income figure of as 
little as $124.59 will be sufficient to trigger the presumption of abuse depending on 
the amount of debtor’s total unsecured debt.32 A debtor with a monthly disposable 
income amount of $124.58 or less will never trigger the means test’s presumption of 
abuse.33 The problem with the calculation, however, is that it is rigid and mechanical. 
As a “snapshot” of debtor’s finances, the formula has no mechanism to allow the 
debtor to explain changes in debtor’s income or expenses that occur shortly before or 
after the computation is completed.34 Similarly, the test has no mechanism to modify 
                                                            
 28 In re Hernandez, No. 08-31588, 2008 WL 5441279, at *9 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Dec.1, 
2008) (“Future events and plans of a debtor are simply not taken into account in [the] ‘means 
test’ calculation. . . . For this and other reasons, the ‘means test’ has been criticized as ‘a blind 
legislative formula that attempts to direct debtors to a [c]hapter that provides for at least some 
measure of repayment to unsecured creditors over a period of years.’”); In re Cribbs, 387 B.R. 
324, 331 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2008); In re Miller, 361 B.R. 224, 234-35 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2007); 
In re Walker, No. 05-15010-WHD, 2006 WL 1314125, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 1, 2006). 
 29 See generally In re Brady, 419 B.R. 479 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009) (discussing the means 
test as a “snapshot” of debtor’s finances on the petition date). In re Norwood-Hill, 403 B.R. 
905, 909 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009); In re Littman, 370 B.R. 820, 828-29 (Bankr. D. Idaho 
2007). 
 30 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A) (West 2013). The type and amount of expenses that debtor 
is allowed to subtract from debtor’s current monthly income (CMI) for purposes of means 
testing is statutorily prescribed by reference to the Internal Revenue Service’s Collection 
Financial Standards, which are used by the IRS in calculating repayment of delinquent taxes. 
See COLLECTION FINANCIAL STANDARDS, available at http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/
Collection-Financial-Standards (last visited on Oct. 15, 2013). 
 31 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A) (West 2013). 
 32 See id. 
 33 See id. 
 34 In re Wise, No. 10-32441, 2011 WL 2133843, at *2 (recognizing that the United States 
Supreme Court has permitted known or virtually certain information about the debtor’s future 
income or expenses to be taken into account when determining a debtor’s “projected 
disposable income” in a chapter 13 case, but that no such provision exists in a chapter 7 
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the calculation to ensure that the disposable income amount yielded by the means 
test reflects those changes.35 As a result, both the current monthly income figure, the 
cornerstone of means testing, and the allowable expense amounts may not accurately 
reflect debtor’s true financial situation.36 This is particularly true where the debtor 
has had a change in his income or expenses just prior or subsequent to the filing of 
the bankruptcy petition.37  
The term “current monthly income” is defined in Section 101(10A) of the 
Bankruptcy Code.38 The term itself, however, is a misnomer as there is nothing 
“current” about the income figure that is used as the basis for means testing under 
BAPCPA.39 A debtor’s CMI is defined as the average monthly income received by 
the debtor from all sources for the six month period preceding the date of filing the 
bankruptcy petition.40 CMI, therefore, is based solely on the debtor’s historical 
income—an average of the money debtor received during the six-month window 
preceding the filing for bankruptcy.41 It is that CMI amount that is used as the basis 
for means testing and that will determine, first, whether debtor is subject to a 
presumption of abuse at all or whether debtor is “safe-harbored” pursuant to Section 
707(b)(7)(A) and, second, whether debtor has too much disposable income to be 
                                                            
bankruptcy case); In re Littman, 370 B.R. at 829 (“The best interpretation of § 707(b)(2) is to 
regard it as requiring a ‘snapshot’ of the debtor’s finances at the time of filing.”). 
 35 In re Wise, 2011 WL 2133843, at *2; In re Littman, 370 B.R. at 829. 
 36 See infra Parts III.A-B; see also David W. Allard & Katherine R. Catanese, The Means 
Test: Seeing Clearly the CMI, 26 AM. BANKR. INST. JOURNAL 12, 12 (2007) (“CMI is the 
cornerstone of the means test because it alone determines . . . whether a debtor is forced to 
navigate his or her way through the morass of local and national deductions, eventually 
leading to a determination of whether a presumption of abuse arises.”); In re Littman, 370 
B.R. at 829 (noting that the means test “does not contain any provision which permits a court 
to review the debtors’ actual finances” and that such an approach is “seemingly capable of 
reaching conclusions about a debtor’s ability to pay divorced from reality”). 
 37 See infra Parts III.A-B. 
 38 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(10A) (West 2013). Section 101(10A) of the bankruptcy code defines 
the term as follows: “The term ‘current monthly income’—(A) means the average monthly 
income from all sources that the debtor receives (or in a joint case the debtor and the debtor’s 
spouse receive) without regard to whether such income is taxable income, derived during the 
6-month period ending on—(i) the last day of the calendar month immediately preceding the 
date of the commencement of the case.” Id. 
 39 Id.; Kilborn, supra note 6, at 7 (“The contrived legalese concept of CMI bears little 
relation to reality or common sense . . . as that term connotes the average of the debtor’s 
monthly income over the past six months.”); Allard & Catanese, supra note 36, at 12 (“[T]he 
exceedingly broad definition of current monthly income does not actually encompass ‘current’ 
income at all; instead, the definition imposes a six-month look-back period.”). 
 40 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(10A)(B) (West 2013) (excluding from the definition of “current 
monthly income” only benefits received under the Social Security Act, payments to victims of 
war crimes or crimes against humanity, and payments to victims of international terrorism). 
 41 Id. 
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allowed to continue his Chapter 7 bankruptcy case.42 If a debtor has an unplanned or 
temporary increase in his income during the six months before filing for bankruptcy, 
therefore, that increase will have the effect of raising the amount of his CMI.43 This 
occurs even where the increase of income was the product of a unique one-time 
event in debtor’s financial life or due to cyclical changes in debtor’s employment 
that will not continue post-petition.44 The effect of including these unique or 
temporary increases of income in debtor’s CMI is that it artificially raises the amount 
of debtor’s disposable income, potentially enough to trigger a presumption of abuse, 
even in cases where the debtor has proof that the extra income will not repeat or will 
not be available to the debtor post-petition.45 In these cases, the disposable income 
figure yielded by the means test is not an accurate predictor of how much money is 
available for the debtor to fund a Chapter 13 plan.46 When one considers that a mere 
$83.33 per month of income marks the difference between the monthly disposable 
income figure that will always trigger a presumption of abuse under the means test 
and the monthly disposable income figure that will never trigger such a presumption, 
it becomes clear that even very slight changes to debtor’s income pre or post-
petition, or to debtor’s expenses, can have a devastating effect on debtor’s Chapter 7 
case.47 
For example, assume that months before filing a bankruptcy petition, debtor has 
been working a few hours of overtime at her place of employment.48 The availability 
of overtime at debtor’s job is limited and additional hours are not offered regularly to 
employees. However, debtor has accepted some extra hours perhaps out of necessity, 
as a last ditch attempt to pay her bills, stave-off foreclosure of her home, avoid 
bankruptcy, or because it has simply been required by her employer. As a result, 
debtor’s income from wages in the three months pre-petition has increased slightly 
by $250.00 per month, raising her monthly income from $3,500 to $3,750 per month 
                                                            
 42 Id. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i); Id. § 707(b)(7)(A) (the safe-harbor provision states that a below-
median income debtor is not subject to the presumption of abuse that arises from the means 
test in § 707(b)(2) of the bankruptcy code). 
 43 See infra Part III.A. 
 44 Id. 
 45 In re Chambers, No. 10-00856-als7, 2011 WL 4479690, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa June 7, 
2011); In re Moore, 446 B.R. 458 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2011); In re Rieck, 427 B.R. 141 (Bankr. 
D. Minn.); In re Cotto, 425 B.R. 72 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Hernandez, No. 08-31588, 
2008 WL 5441279, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Dec. 1, 2008); In re Parulan, 387 B.R. 168 
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008).  
 46 In re Chambers, 2011 WL 4479690; In re Moore, 446 B.R. at 458; In re Rieck, 427 
B.R. at 141; In re Cotto, 425 B.R. at 72; In re Hernandez, 2008 WL 5441279, at *3; In re 
Parulan, 387 B.R. at 168. 
 47 The court must presume that abuse exists if debtor’s current monthly income is greater 
than the median family income of the applicable state for a family of the same or fewer 
individuals and such income, reduced by the amounts determined in 707(b)(2)(A)(ii), (iii), and 
(iv), and “multiplied by 60 is not less than the lesser of—(I) 25 percent of the debtor’s 
nonpriority unsecured claims . . . , or $7,475, whichever is greater; or (II) $12,475.” 11 
U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i)(I)-(II) (West 2013). 
 48 This example is loosely based on the cases of In re Chambers, 2011 WL 4479690, and 
In re Parulan, 387 B.R. 168. 
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for the three months prior to the bankruptcy filing. Because of how CMI is 
calculated, when debtor files her Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, debtor’s CMI is 
$3,625, an amount only modestly higher than the $3,500 CMI debtor would have 
had without the overtime pay. If one assumes that debtor has allowable living and 
other expenses totaling $3,419, the $125 monthly increase in debtor’s CMI due to 
the overtime pay is sufficient to trigger a presumption of abuse and foreclose the 
debtor from being able to continue her Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. By contrast, 
Debtor’s CMI without the overtime pay would not have triggered the means test’s 
abuse presumption and the debtor would have been able to proceed with her Chapter 
7 case.49 The unfairness of this result is particularly acute when one considers that 
the overtime available to Debtor is short-lived or a one-time occurrence and 
unavailable to Debtor as an additional source of income post-petition. In this case, 
because of a very slight change in Debtor’s income pre-petition, the means test 
incorrectly identifies the debtor as a person with sufficient means to pay creditors a 
significant amount post-petition. Debtor’s only recourse if she is to stay in Chapter 
7, therefore, is to show that the temporary pre-petition overtime payments are a 
“special circumstance” that merit a reduction of Debtor’s current monthly income 
figure in order to accurately yield Debtor’s actual repayment capacity.50 If such a 
circumstance is not considered special enough by the bankruptcy court, debtor will 
be denied Chapter 7 bankruptcy relief and may choose to convert the case to a 
Chapter 13 or be forced to forego bankruptcy relief altogether.51  
Although some bankruptcy attorneys would advise a debtor in such a situation to 
wait to file his bankruptcy petition until his income level returns to normal, some 
debtors will not have the luxury of time and may have to file their bankruptcy 
petition immediately in order to avoid the foreclosure of their home or some other 
adverse economic event.52 Furthermore, this type of result is not limited to cases 
where the debtor has received an atypical increase in income shortly pre-petition. 
The results of the means test will be skewed against the debtor in cases where the 
debtor has a change in employment either pre or post-petition that affects income, in 
cases where the debtor has received a one-time severance or other payment shortly 
before filing the petition, and in cases where the debtor has a change in expenses and 
that expense is either not considered an allowable expense for purposes of means 
testing or is capped by one of the applicable standards.53 In each of those cases, the 
disposable income figure yielded by the means test is artificially inflated creating the 
illusion that debtor can pay his creditors more than what in reality is available for 
                                                            
 49 In cases where a debtor is not subject to the means test presumption of abuse, either 
because the debtor is a below-median debtor or because the means test calculation yields that 
debtor’s disposable income is below the statutory amount, the court may still dismiss debtor’s 
chapter 7 case for abuse if the debtor filed the petition in bad faith or if the totality of the 
circumstances of the debtor’s financial condition demonstrates abuse. 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(3) 
(West 2013). 
 50 Id. § 707(b)(2)(B). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464, 2476 (2010) (recognizing that waiting to file a 
bankruptcy petition is not feasible for most debtors and, in some cases, may be indicative of 
bad faith). 
 53 See infra Parts III.A-B. 
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debtor to fund a Chapter 13 plan.54 By contrast, in cases where a debtor’s disposable 
income is artificially low, because the debtor has timed his petition to take advantage 
of a lull in employment, for example, Section 707(b)(3) of the bankruptcy code 
provides two additional mechanisms that allow a bankruptcy court to dismiss 
debtor’s case for bad faith or based on the totality of circumstances.55 A bankruptcy 
court considering the dismissal of a case for abuse on these grounds must consider 
pre and post-petition changes to debtor’s employment and income that show that the 
debtor’s repayment capacity is actually higher than the amount yielded by the means 
test calculation.56 Accordingly, in cases where the means test calculation 
inaccurately overestimates debtor’s repayment capacity to the debtor’s detriment, 
debtor’s only recourse is to prove ‘special circumstances.’57 If the special 
circumstances standard is set extraordinarily high by the court, debtor will not meet 
that burden and the debtor’s case will be dismissed. Where the means test 
inaccurately underestimates debtor’s repayment capacity, however, the bankruptcy 
trustee may still seek the dismissal of debtor’s case for abuse on two additional 
grounds both which require the bankruptcy court to consider and assess debtor’s 
actual financial condition at the time of the request for dismissal.58  
III. WHEN “SPECIAL” REALLY MEANS “EXTRAORDINARY”: THE INSURMOUNTABLE 
PRESUMPTION OF ABUSE AND ITS EFFECT ON CONSUMER DEBTORS 
The special circumstances provision is complex and requires debtors who want to 
rebut the presumption of abuse to overcome multiple substantive and procedural 
hurdles.59 The provision itself makes it clear that Congress did not intend “special 
circumstances” to be an easy or convenient way for debtors to circumvent means 
testing.60 However, there is nothing in the statute indicating that the special 
                                                            
 54 Id. 
 55 Section 707(b)(3) states: “In considering under paragraph (1) whether granting of relief 
would be an abuse of the provisions of this chapter in a case in which the presumption in 
paragraph (2)(A)(i) does not arise or is rebutted, the court shall consider—(A) whether the 
debtor filed the petition in bad faith; or (B) the totality of the circumstances . . . of the debtor’s 
financial situation demonstrates abuse.” 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(3)(A)-(B) (West 2013). 
 56 Dreher, supra note 20 (noting that a debtor that purposefully manipulates income pre-
petition may be found to be filing in bad faith and that a court may consider the debtor’s 
ability to pay unsecured creditors when determining whether to dismiss case for abuse based 
on totality of circumstances); In re Henenbury, 361 B.R. 595, 607-08 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) 
(holding that the debtor’s current financial situation had to be considered when determining 
whether to dismiss debtor’s bankruptcy case for abuse when the debtor was unemployed at the 
time of filing the petition but got a job earning $39,000 annually shortly after filing for 
bankruptcy); In re Pak, 343 B.R. 239, 245-46 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006) (holding that the 
debtor’s “actual and anticipated future income” must be used rather than debtor’s current 
monthly income in deciding whether to grant or deny a motion to dismiss a chapter 7 case 
under section 707(b)(3)(B)). 
 57 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i)-(iv) (West 2013). 
 58 In re Henenbury, 361 B.R. at 607-08; In re Pak, 343 B.R. at 245-46. 
 59 11 U.S.C.A. §707(b)(2)(B)(i)-(iv) (West 2013). 
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circumstances standard should be extremely high or nearly insurmountable for 
consumer debtors.61 Section 707(b)(2)(B) of the bankruptcy code states in relevant 
part: 
(B)(i) [T]he presumption of abuse may only be rebutted by demonstrating 
special circumstances, such as a serious medical condition or a call or 
order to active duty in the Armed Forces, to the extent such special 
circumstances that justify additional expenses or adjustments of current 
monthly income for which there is no reasonable alternative. 
(ii) In order to establish special circumstances, the debtor shall be 
required to itemize each additional expense or adjustment of income and 
to provide-- (I) documentation for such expense or adjustment to income; 
and (II) a detailed explanation of the special circumstances that make such 
expenses or adjustment to income necessary and reasonable.62 
To rebut a presumption of abuse, therefore, the debtor must meet both the 
substantive and procedural requirements of the statute.63 First, the debtor must prove 
that the substance of the situation that created the need for the adjustment to CMI or 
additional expenses is sufficiently “special” to warrant different treatment under the 
bankruptcy code.64 Bankruptcy courts have broad discretion to determine whether 
the debtor’s situation can be considered “special” or whether the debtor’s Chapter 7 
filing is abusive.65 The debtor must then be able to prove that his “special 
circumstances” require a reduction to debtor’s current monthly income or an increase 
of allowable expenses, for which there is no reasonable alternative, and explain why 
such adjustments are reasonable and necessary.66 A debtor can only rebut the abuse 
presumption when these monetary adjustments cause debtor’s monthly disposable 
income, when projected out over sixty months, to fall below the statutory threshold 
                                                            
 60 In re Champagne, 389 B.R. 191, 198 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008) (stating that the multiple 
requirements of § 707(b)(2)(B)(i)-(iv) is linked to concerns that the rebuttal provision not be 
used as a convenient way for chapter 7 debtors to select a more expensive lifestyle); In re 
Sparks, 360 B.R. 224, 230-31 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2006). 
 61 In re Haman, 366 B.R. 307, 313-14 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007); In re Champagne, 389 B.R. 
at 198; In re Polinghorn, 436 B.R. 484, 489-90 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010). 
 62 11 U.S.C.A. §707(b)(2)(B)(i)-(iv) (West 2013) (“The presumption of abuse may only be 
rebutted if the additional expenses or adjustments to income referred to in clause (i) cause the 
product of the debtor’s current monthly income reduced by the amounts determined under 
clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv) of subparagraph (A) when multiplied by 60 to be less than the lesser 
of—(I) 25 percent of the debtor’s nonpriority unsecured claims, or $7,475, whichever is 
greater; or (II) $12,475.”). 
 63 Id. § 707(b)(2)(B); Tabb & McClelland, supra note 20, at 512; In re Templeton, 365 
B.R. 213, 214 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2007) (stating that burden is on the debtor to prove that a 
requested adjustment qualifies as a special circumstance). 
 64 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(B) (West 2013); Tabb & McClelland, supra note 20, at 467-68. 
 65 In re Stocker, 399 B.R. 522, 530 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008); In re Templeton, 365 B.R. at 
215.  
 66 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(B) (West 2013); Tabb & McClelland, supra note 20, at 499-
500. 
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amounts in Section 707(b)(2)(A)(i).67 Finally, to satisfy his procedural burden, 
debtor must itemize each additional expense or reduction of current monthly income 
and provide adequate documentation of the changes.68 Debtor’s failure to meet any 
of these requirements will result in the dismissal of debtor’s Chapter 7 case or, with 
debtor’s consent, to a conversion of the case to Chapter 13.69  
Congress provided bankruptcy courts with very little guidance on how to 
interpret the special circumstances provision.70 Congress did not define the term 
“special circumstances” in the Bankruptcy Code, but instead chose to provide two 
examples of what would satisfy the standard—a serious medical condition or a call 
to active military duty.71 As a result, courts are divided on how strictly to construe 
the statute and whether the standard for finding “special circumstances” should 
require the debtor to meet a significantly high threshold or prove “extraordinary” 
circumstances.72 While the Code expressly states that special circumstance 
                                                            
 67 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(B)(iv) (West 2013). 
 68 Id. § 707(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
 69 In re Taylor, 417 B.R. 762, 762 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2009) (“Even if circumstances 
alleged by Chapter 7 debtor in attempt to rebut ‘means test’ presumption of abuse could be 
regarded as ‘special circumstances,’ debtor’s failure to satisfy procedural requirements of 
‘special circumstances’ provision, by itemizing each additional expense or adjustment of 
income, providing documentation for each such expense or adjustment to income, and 
offering detailed explanation of special circumstances that make such expenses or adjustments 
to income necessary and reasonable, prevented court from finding that presumption of abuse 
had been rebutted.”); see also AM. BANKR. INST., CONSUMER PRACTITIONERS: HOW’S LIFE 
UNDER BAPCPA?: AN UPDATE ON POST-BAPCPA CONSUMER CASE LAW, CENT. STATES 
BANKR. WORKSHOP 1, 5 (2009) (“There is a substantial likelihood that a failure to provide 
evidentiary support of the special circumstances will cause the case to be dismissed without 
decision on the actual merits.”). 
 70 In re Vaccariello, 375 B.R. 809, 813 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) (“The code does not 
define ‘special circumstances,’ but merely provides some non-exclusive examples of what 
may be considered special circumstances.”); see In re Delbecq, 368 B.R. 754, 757 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ind. 2007) (“Certainly, the plain meaning of ‘special’ provides some instruction to the 
Court. . . . However, given the myriad of possible scenarios—from the exceedingly rare to the 
slightly unusual—it is difficult for the Court to discern exactly what Congress intended by its 
use of the word.”). 
 71 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) (West 2013); In re Vaccariello, 375 B.R. at 813. 
 72 In re Smith, 436 B.R. 476, 481 (Bankr. N. D. Ohio 2010) (holding that debtor failed to 
prove special circumstances where debtor could not show that there was a “sudden or 
catastrophic event” that caused a “sudden and precipitous rise in debt”); In re Burggraf, 436 
B.R. 466, 471 (Bankr. N. D. Ohio 2010); In re Stocker, 399 B.R. 522, 522 (Bankr. M. D. Fla. 
2008) (“[T]he factors giving rise to additional expenses or adjustments of income must be 
extraordinary or exceptional, unexpected or involuntary, and must substantially impact 
debtor’s financial situation.”). But see In re Champagne, 389 B.R. 191, 191 (“Burden on 
chapter 7 debtor of establishing ‘special circumstances’ sufficient to rebut ‘means test’ 
presumption of abuse is not particularly high; standard is special, not extraordinary 
circumstances.”); In re Delbecq, 368 B.R. at 757-60 (stating that, based on BAPCPA’s 
legislative history, “the term ‘special circumstances’ requires a fact-specific, case-by-case 
inquiry into whether the debtor has a ‘meaningful ability’ to pay his or her debts in light of an 
additional expense or adjustment to income not otherwise reflected in the means test 
calculation”).  
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adjustments should only be allowed where it is “necessary and reasonable,” the word 
“extraordinary” is notably absent from the text of Section 707(b)(2)(B).73 The plain 
meaning of the statute does not support an interpretation of the standard that would 
require the debtor to prove extraordinary or exceptional circumstances to rebut the 
means test’s presumption of abuse.74 The term is similarly absent from BAPCPA’s 
legislative history.75 In fact, the phrase “extraordinary circumstances” is only used in 
very early versions of the bankruptcy reform legislation and, notably, the language 
of the statute was later changed to “special circumstances” to specifically provide for 
a different standard.76 In a Senate report accompanying Senate bill 625, a precursor 
to the bill that would later become BAPCPA, Senator Orrin G. Hatch emphasized 
the provision’s role as a safeguard within the bankruptcy reform and noted the 
significant change in the statutory language of the provision from its embodiment in 
prior bills.77 Senator Hatch stated: 
In order to protect debtors from rigid and arbitrary application of a means-
test, section 102 also provides that in some cases where the presumption 
applies the debtor may be able to demonstrate ‘special circumstances’ that 
justify additional expenses or an adjustment to the debtor’s income. The 
Committee adopted the ‘special circumstances’ standard, rather than the 
‘extraordinary circumstances’ standard included in the Conference 
Report to accompany H.R. 3150 to provide a different standard of when a 
debtor may overcome the presumption of abuse. In applying the ‘special 
circumstances’ test, it is important to note that a debtor who requests a 
special circumstances adjustment is requesting preferential treatment 
when compared to other consumers. . . . In order to ensure fairness with 
respect to the consumers who must pay the cost when others discharge 
debts in bankruptcy, it is essential that the ‘special circumstances’ test 
establish a significant, meaningful threshold which a debtor must satisfy 
in order to receive the preferential treatment.78 
The change in the proposed statutory language from “extraordinary” 
circumstances to “special” circumstances is notable, particularly when considered in 
light of other congressional reports. In a 1999 House Report the Committee on the 
Judiciary criticized the proposed language for the special circumstances provision 
stating that “the multiple hurdles for rebutting the presumption of abuse . . . [were] 
conflicting and so strict as to effectively preclude the debtor from proving the 
                                                            
 73 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(B) (West 2013). 
 74 In re Delbecq, 368 B.R. at 757-60; In re Haman, 366 B.R. 307, 313-15 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2007). 
 75 See In re Delbecq, 368 B.R. at 757-60 (summarizing the development of the “special 
circumstances” provision in BAPCPA’s legislative history); see also In re Haman, 366 B.R. at 
313-15; S. REP. NO. 106-49, AT *8 (1999), 1999 WL 300934. 
 76 See also In re Delbecq, 368 B.R. at 757-60; S. REP. NO. 106-49, at *7. 
 77 S. REP. NO. 106-49, at *7. 
 78 S. REP. NO. 106-49, at *6-7 (emphasis added); see also H.R. REP. NO. 106-126, at *24 
(1999), 1999 WL 269112 (changing the proposed statutory language from “extraordinary 
circumstances” to “special circumstances”). 
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existence of reasonable expenses that are not included within the IRS standards.”79 
Accordingly, the Committee suggested the deletion of the word “extraordinary” from 
the proposed language for Section 707(b)(2)(B).80 Therefore, while the legislative 
history to BAPCPA shows that Congress intended that there be a significant 
threshold for the special circumstances standard, it is also clear that the threshold 
that Congress envisioned was not meant to be insurmountable.81 Special 
circumstance adjustments should not allow debtors to choose a more expensive 
lifestyle, but should function to ensure that means testing does not arbitrarily deny 
debtors without a demonstrable ability to repay creditors the benefit of a Chapter 7 
discharge.82 Congress described the special circumstances provision as a “procedural 
safeguard[]” that would ensure that the “individual circumstances of each bankrupt 
[is] considered before [the case] is dismissed or converted to Chapter 13.”83 If the 
provision is to properly function as the “safeguard” that Congress intended it to be, 
bankruptcy courts must adhere to a more moderate and consistent approach in their 
interpretation of “special circumstances” rather than holding the debtor to an 
heightened standard not supported by the text of the statute.  
An analysis of case law shows that bankruptcy courts disagree on what types of 
situations or events in a debtor’s life are “special” enough to cause the financial 
impact that should be reflected in the means test calculation.84 Courts generally agree 
that “special circumstances” are not limited to a medical condition or call to active 
military duty, the examples stated in the statute, and that canons of statutory 
construction require that debtor’s situation be similar in nature or share traits in 
common with the legislatively provided examples.85 Courts cannot agree, however, 
                                                            
 79 H.R. REP. NO. 106-123, at *205 (1999), 1999 WL 306442 (suggesting that the words 
“only,” “extraordinary,” and “necessary” should be deleted from proposed § 707(b)(2)(B)). 
 80 Id. 
 81 S. REP. NO. 106-49, *6. 
 82 BAPCPA’s legislative history shows that Congress was concerned that a strictly 
mathematical means test could produce arbitrary results for some consumer debtors. Id. at *8. 
 83 Id. at *8; see also In re Cribbs, 387 B.R. 324, 330 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2008) (“While 
Congress adopted a ‘special circumstance’ safety valve to [the] means test formula, judges 
should be mindful to honor the fundamental intent of the new statute.”). 
 84 In re Cribbs, 387 B.R. at 329 (noting that courts have struggled to define the scope of 
what constitutes a “special circumstance” with one line of cases taking a “narrow view” of the 
exception limiting it to circumstances that are similar to the examples in the statute, while 
some courts take an “expansive view” finding that there are special circumstances when 
debtor lacks a “meaningful ability to repay” creditors). 
 85 In re Rieck, 427 B.R. 141, 145 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2010); In re Taylor, 417 B.R. 762, 765 
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2009) (noting that to qualify as a special circumstance, the situation 
presented by debtor must have “traits in common” with the examples of special circumstances 
given in the statute); In re Tauter, 402 B.R. 903, 906 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009) (noting that 
special circumstances are not limited to those enumerated in the statute, but must be similar in 
nature); In re Stocker, 399 B.R. 522, 527 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2008); In re Patterson, 392 B.R. 
497, 504 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2008); In re Robinette, No. 7-06-10585 SA, 2007 WL 2955960, at 
*4 (Bankr. D.N.M. Oct. 2, 2007) (“[T]he two examples of special circumstances enumerated 
in the statute are not the only circumstances that debtors may cite, nor even archetypal 
circumstances.”); In re Armstrong, No. 06-31414, 2007 WL 1544591, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio May 24, 2007) (“The examples of special circumstances in § 707(b)(2)(B)(i) are not 
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on how “similar” debtor’s circumstances must be to those examples to satisfy the 
standard in the statute.86  
Some courts take a moderate approach emphasizing that the standard requires the 
debtor to prove special circumstances not extraordinary ones.87 These courts 
generally find that the language in the statute does not lend itself to constructing a 
per se rule.88 Instead, the court must engage in a fact-specific inquiry, using its 
discretion to determine whether debtor’s particular situation is a “special 
circumstance.”89 In these cases, the burden on debtor is not especially high.90 A 
debtor may rebut the abuse presumption if he can show that he lacks a “meaningful 
ability to repay” creditors in light of documented income or expense adjustments, 
not reflected in the means test formula, that would result in an economic unfairness 
to the debtor if not considered by the court when determining the debtor’s disposable 
                                                            
exhaustive; they are merely illustrative of the type of circumstances that Congress found 
warranted an adjustment to the disposable income calculation under the means test. Applying 
the principle of ejusdem generis, a canon of statutory interpretation, the court must ‘interpret 
legislatively provided examples as typical of the general category covered.’” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
 86 In re Ross, No. 10-81200-DHW, 2011 WL 482815, at *3 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Feb. 7, 
2011) (stating that debtor’s circumstances must be similar to those in the statute—
unanticipated, unavoidable, and beyond the debtor’s control); In re Parulan, 387 B.R. 168, 168 
(“Though examples provided by Congress of what might constitute a ‘special circumstance,’ 
. . . i.e. a serious medical condition or call to active duty in the armed forces, were not meant 
to be exclusive, Congress clearly intended to set the ‘special circumstances’ bar extremely 
high, placing it effectively off limits for most debtors.”). But see In re Littman, 370 B.R. 820, 
831 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007) (noting that there is limited utility, in certain cases, in using the 
statutory examples as illustrations or as archetypal); In re Delbecq, 368 B.R. 754, 758 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ind. 2007) (“[T]he legislative history does not indicate that the explicit examples 
included in § 707(b)(2)(B) were intended to define, qualify or otherwise limit the meaning of 
‘special circumstances.’”). 
 87 In re Champagne, 389 B.R. 191, 191 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008) (“Burden on Chapter 7 
debtor of establishing ‘special circumstances’ sufficient to rebut ‘means test’ presumption of 
abuse is not particularly high; standard is special, not extraordinary, circumstances.”); In re 
Martin, 371 B.R. 347, 352 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007); In re Haman, 366 B.R. 307, 313 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2007); In re Knight, 370 B.R. 429, 437-38 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2007); In re Delbecq, 386 
B.R. at 758-59. 
 88 In re Armstrong, 2007 WL 1544591, at *6-7; In re Martin, 371 B.R. at 352; In re 
Delbecq, 386 B.R. at 758-59. 
 89 In re Martin, 371 B.R. at 352 (“[T]he term ‘special circumstances’ requires a fact-
specific, case-by-case inquiry into whether a debtor has a ‘meaningful ability’ to pay his or 
her debts in light of an additional expense or adjustment to income not otherwise reflected in 
the means test calculation.”); In re Littman, 370 B.R. at 831 (noting that the court must 
undertake “an analysis of the specific ‘special circumstance’ alleged and an evaluation of 
whether a debtor has adequately shown all the elements needed to adjust the means test 
calculation, including itemization, documentation, reasonableness, necessity, and lack of 
reasonable alternative for each income adjustment or additional expense urged”); In re 
Templeton, 365 B.R. 213, 215 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2007) (“’[S]pecial circumstances’ is a fact-
specific consideration.”). 
 90 In re Champagne, 389 B.R. at 198. 
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income.91 The circumstance asserted by the debtor to be “special” must still be one 
that is “out of the ordinary” and that leaves the debtor “with no reasonable 
alternative” other than to incur the expense or modify his income.92  
Other courts, however, have held that the provision must be construed strictly 
and that only the most exceptional of events or situations will require that the court 
modify the current monthly income or expense figures of the means test.93 In these 
cases, in order to rebut a presumption of abuse, a debtor will need to prove that the 
circumstance necessitating an adjustment of the means test calculation is 
extraordinary and involuntary, or beyond the debtor’s control.94 In the case of In re 
Cribbs, the court aptly summarized some of the most common words or terms used 
by these courts in assessing whether debtor’s circumstances are indeed sufficiently 
“special.”95 These include circumstances that are: (1) “[u]nanticipated”; (2) “[t]ruly 
unavoidable”; (3) “[b]eyond the reasonable control of the debtor”; (4) “[o]ut of the 
ordinary”; and (5) “[u]nforeseeable.”96 Yet, nothing in the plain text of the statute 
requires that the circumstances asserted by debtor to be “special” must be 
involuntary, completely unanticipated, or beyond the scope of debtor’s control to 
                                                            
 91 In re Cribbs, 387 B.R. 324, 329 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2008) (noting that some courts take an 
expansive view of the provision finding “special circumstances” where the debtor lacks 
meaningful ability to repay in light of income or expense adjustments not reflected in the 
means test or where, if no adjustment occurs it “will result in economic unfairness to 
debtor.”); In re Martin, 371 B.R. at 352; In re Knight, 370 B.R. at 437-38 (“A special 
circumstance is one that, if the debtor is not permitted to adjust her income or expenses 
accordingly, results in a demonstrable economic unfairness.”); In re Armstrong, 2007 WL 
1544591, at *6-7; In re Delbecq, 368 B.R. at 758 (“[T]he term ‘special circumstances’ 
requires a fact-specific, case-by-case inquiry into whether the debtor has a ‘meaningful 
ability’ to pay his or her debts in light of an additional expense or adjustment to income not 
otherwise reflected in the means test calculation.”); see also In re Haman, 366 B.R. at 313-14; 
In re Ross, 2011 WL 482815, at *2. 
 92 In re Martin, 371 B.R. at 352; In re Armstrong, 2007 WL 1544591, at *7. 
 93 In re Smith, 436 B.R. 476, 480 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010) (holding that debtor failed to 
prove special circumstances because debtor could not show that he was victim of sudden or 
catastrophic event); In re Rieck, 427 B.R. 141, 146 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2010) (“Although this 
presumption may be rebutted, [section] 707(b) goes on to set this bar extremely high, placing 
it effectively off limits for most debtors.”); In re Schley, No. 08-26146-svk, 2008 WL 
3895562, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Aug. 22, 2008) (“Beyond the special circumstances 
expressly described in the statute, i.e., a serious medical condition or active duty in the Armed 
Forces, ‘debtors with lost jobs, domestic relations problems, children in trouble, natural 
disasters, [and] car wrecks’ may qualify.”); In re Stocker, 399 B.R. 522, 531 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 2008). 
 94 In re Pignotti, No. 07-04109-lmj7, 2011 WL 1299616, at *5 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Apr. 1, 
2011) (additional expenses not special circumstance because undertaken voluntarily); In re 
Stocker, 399 B.R. at 531 (circumstances must be “unexpected” or “involuntary”); In re 
Lightsey, 374 B.R. 377, 382 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007) (stating that to qualify as a “special 
circumstance,” the event must be “unforseeable” or “beyond the control of the debtor”); In re 
Sparks, 360 B.R. 224, 225 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2006) (explaining that “special circumstances 
exception must be strictly construed to allow only those expenses which are truly unavoidable 
to debtor”). 
 95 In re Cribbs, 387 B.R. at 330. 
 96 Id. 
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss4/6
2013] NOT “SPECIAL” ENOUGH FOR CHAPTER 7 1001 
 
satisfy the standard.97 The statute simply states that the special circumstances must 
“justify additional expenses or adjustments of current monthly income for which 
there is no reasonable alternative.”98 The additional “involuntariness” and 
“unanticipated” requirements have been mistakenly imputed by some courts into the 
special circumstances standard as a result of the examples provided by Congress in 
the statute.99 As several courts have aptly noted, however, a call to active duty in the 
Armed Forces or a medical condition are not events that are necessarily always 
unanticipated, involuntary, or outside debtor’s control.100 Accordingly, these 
statutory examples cannot and should not be used to impute such requirements into 
                                                            
 97 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(B) (West 2013); see also In re Armstrong, 2007 WL 
1544591, at *3 (recognizing that the there is no language in § 707(b)(2)(B) that suggests that 
the special circumstance must be unanticipated or outside the control of the debtor); In re 
Robinette, No. 7-06-10585 SA, 2007 WL 2955960, at *4 (Bankr. D.N.M. Oct. 2, 2007) 
(“Nothing in the language of the statute requires that the circumstances be an act outside of a 
debtor’s control.”); In re Haman, 366 B.R. 307, 313 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (“Congress’ use of 
the words ‘such as’ to introduce the examples indicate its intent to provide a non-exhaustive 
list of illustrations rather than to constrict any application of the statute.”); In re Graham, 363 
B.R. 844, 850-51 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007) (stating that “[n]othing in the statute suggests or 
mandates that ‘special circumstances’ be outside of the control of the debtor” and that 
Congress could have limited the statute in that way if that is what it intended); see United 
States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (Where “the statute’s language is 
plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.’”). 
 98 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(B) (West 2013) (emphasis added). 
 99 In re DeJoy, No. 11-10268, 2011 WL 5827319, at *4 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2011) 
(interpreting the statute’s “no reasonable alternative language” as equivalent to a requirement 
that the circumstance be unforeseeable or beyond the debtor’s control); In re Tranmer, 355 
B.R. 234, 251 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2006) (“’[S]pecial circumstances’ contemplates 
circumstances beyond a debtor’s reasonable control, such as a ‘serious medical condition, or a 
call or order to active duty in the Armed Forces.’”); In re Sparks, 360 B.R. at 230 (noting that 
the two examples in the statute are the “type of unanticipated development which leaves a 
debtor with no reasonable alternative but to incur the expense or accept the income 
adjustment”); In re Castle, 362 B.R. 846, 851 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006) (stating that the 
examples in the statute constitute situations that “arise from circumstances normally beyond 
the debtor’s control”). But see In re Littman, 370 B.R. 820, 831 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007) 
(stating that “[t]he examples themselves are not key,” but rather that “compliance with the 
requirements to itemize, document, verify, establish reasonableness and necessity, and prove 
‘no reasonable alternative’ are key”); In re Haman, 366 B.R. at 314; In re Thompson, 350 
B.R. 770, 777 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006) (noting that these examples do not necessarily 
indicate that the special circumstances must be involuntary, but rather the two examples 
“share the elements of a distinctive situation that justif[y] additional expenses or adjustment of 
income for which there is no reasonable alternative”). 
 100 In re Littman, 370 B.R. at 831 (“The argument that a common trait in the examples is an 
act outside the debtor’s control is not compelling.”); In re Armstrong, 2007 WL 1544591, at 
*3 (“A call to service on active duty in the Armed Forces might sometimes be anticipated.”); 
In re Haman, 366 B.R. at 313 (“[I]t is even open to question whether the examples provided 
imply circumstances incurred or developed involuntarily.”); In re Templeton, 365 B.R. 213, 
217 (Bankr. W.D. Ok. 2007) (noting that neither example in the bankruptcy code—a serious 
medical condition or a call to active military duty—is necessarily entirely involuntary in 
nature because “[t]he serious health condition could stem from a self-inflicted injury, and an 
individual called to active duty could have voluntarily enlisted.”). 
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the standard.101 In fact, the legislative history of BAPCPA indicates that the 
examples in the statute were not included to limit judicial discretion or to define 
special circumstances, but rather were added late in the legislative process to ensure 
that those debtors that could not pay their bills because of illness or military service 
would not be forced to do so.102 In a recent case, one court noted that courts must be 
mindful that a legal presumption “serves only as a rule of evidence to assist in 
determining the ultimate finding of the court.”103 A court should, therefore, “construe 
the statutory standard for rebuttal in a fashion that will allow a fair determination of 
whether abuse has occurred.”104  
The overly strict interpretation of the special circumstances provision, therefore, 
is concerning because it can create a nearly insurmountable standard of proof which 
Congress did not intend. That standard leaves consumer debtors that have income 
just slightly above the state median without an “out” even in cases where it creates a 
demonstrable economic unfairness.105 Additionally, it removes from the courts the 
flexibility and discretion that Congress sought to preserve through the inclusion of 
this provision in the bankruptcy code.106 Moreover, in some cases, particularly where 
a debtor’s CMI is not representative of debtor’s actual income, it can create a catch-
22 for the debtor that forecloses the possibility of proceeding with a Chapter 7 case 
where a Chapter 13 case may not be feasible.107  
A. Adjustments to “Current Monthly Income” (CMI) 
Bankruptcy courts undertaking a strict interpretation of Section 707(b)(2)(B), for 
example, will not allow a special circumstance adjustment to debtor’s CMI even 
when that amount does not accurately reflect debtor’s actual income or debtor’s real 
                                                            
 101 In re Delbecq, 368 B.R. 754, 759 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2007); In re Haman, 366 B.R. at 
313-14. 
 102 In re Delbecq, 368 B.R. at 758-59 (summarizing BAPCPA’s legislative history and 
concluding that “the examples of ‘special circumstances’—added to the provision in 2005 by 
way of an amendment proposed by Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama—were seemingly 
designed to explicitly protect military personnel from the effects of means testing” rather than 
to define, qualify or limit the meaning of special circumstances); In re Haman, 366 B.R. at 
313-14. 
 103 In re Howell, 477 B.R. 314, 316-17 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Presumptions provide 
convenient and shorthand paths to reach a proper finding of fact. Opportunities for rebuttal 
serve to correct those outcomes where the presumed conclusion deviates from an underlying 
goal or statutory intent.”). 
 104 Id. at 316. 
 105 See infra Parts III.A-B. 
 106 In re Castle, 362 B.R. 846, 850 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006) (“The effect of this section is 
to give the Court some discretion to . . . allow changes in the ‘means test’ equation.”); S. REP. 
NO. 106-49, at *8 (1999), 1999 WL 300934 (“[T]he new section 707(b) contains numerous 
procedural safeguards in order to ensure that the individual circumstances of each bankrupt 
will be considered before he or she is dismissed or converted to chapter 13.”). 
 107 In re Wise, No. 10-32441, 2011 WL 2133843 (Bankr. S.D. Ill., May 27, 2011); In re 
Burggraf, 436 B.R. 466 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010); In re Castle, 362 B.R. 846 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ohio 2006); In re Johns, 342 B.R. 626 (Bankr. E.D. Ok. 2006). 
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ability to pay creditors.108 Courts that are, in effect, using an “extraordinary 
circumstances” standard will likely not allow the debtor to rebut a presumption of 
abuse when the debtor’s CMI amount is artificially inflated by a one-time pre-
petition payment or where there have been irregular changes in debtor’s wages or 
income shortly before or after the filing of the petition that, in effect, skew the 
debtor’s “current monthly income” making it appear higher.109 The court may find 
that such circumstances are not “special” because the event is not unforeseeable or 
sufficiently uncommon, is not similar enough in nature to the “medical condition” or 
“call to active duty” examples provided in the statute, or because some aspect of the 
circumstance was voluntarily undertaken by the debtor.110 In these cases, the debtor 
will be unable to continue in Chapter 7 even if debtor is just barely above the median 
income for his state or has insufficient income to make significant payments under a 
Chapter 13 plan.111 
In In re Cotto, for example, the bankruptcy court dismissed debtors’ Chapter 7 
case for presumed abuse because debtors’ CMI was $57.50 above the statutory 
maximum—presumptively showing that debtors had the ability to repay their debts 
                                                            
 108 In re Wise, 2011 WL 2133843; In re Cotto, 425 B.R. 72, 77-78 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010); 
In re Hernandez, No. 08-31588, 2008 WL 5441279 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio, Dec. 1, 2008); In re 
Schley, No. 08-26146-svk, 2008 WL 3895562, at *8 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Aug. 22, 2008). 
 109 In re Taborski, No. 12-23966-CMB, 2013 WL 211116, at *7 (Bankr. W.D. Penn., Jan. 
18, 2013) (holding that a one-time pre-petition bonus was not a special circumstance 
warranting an adjustment of debtor’s “current monthly income”); In re Wise, 2011 WL 
2133843, at *2 (holding that debtor’s post-petition decrease in income due to loss of child 
support payments is not a special circumstance that requires adjustment of debtor’s “current 
monthly income” in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case); In re Smith, 436 B.R. 476, 481-82 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ohio 2010) (holding that debtor’s fluctuations in income were insufficient to constitute a 
special circumstance); In re Cotto, 425 B.R. at 77-78 (one-time wage settlement payment 
received by debtor pre-petition could not be excluded from CMI and was not a special 
circumstance requiring adjustment of debtor’s CMI); In re Rieck, 427 B.R. 141, 147 (Bankr. 
D. Minn. 2010) (holding that a one-time pre-petition liquidation of a savings bond by debtor 
was not a special circumstance); In re Parulan, 387 B.R. 168, 171-73 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008) 
(holding that debtor’s fluctuations in income due to loss of extra overtime payments were not 
special circumstance because reductions in overtime are not an “uncommon,” “unusual,” or 
“exceptional” event); In re Hernandez, 2008 WL 5441279, at *4 (holding that debtor’s rise in 
income pre-petition due to working two jobs was not a special circumstance requiring 
adjustment of debtor’s CMI for purposes of chapter 7 means testing). But see In re Robinette, 
No. 7-06-10585 SA, 2007 WL 2955960, at *4 (Bankr. D.N.M. Oct. 2, 2007) (holding that a 
one-time bonus received by wife required a special circumstance adjustment of CMI because 
debtor had no reasonable alternative to replacing this income); In re Martin, 371 B.R. 347, 
353-54 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007) (holding that debtor’s post-petition decrease in income due to 
loss of overtime was special circumstance because it significantly decreased the amount 
originally calculated as debtor’s CMI). 
 110 In re Taborski, 2013 WL 211116, at *7; In re Wise, 2011 WL 2133843, at *2; In re 
Smith, 436 B.R. at 481-82; In re Cotto, 425 B.R. at 77-78; In re Rieck, 427 B.R. at 147; In re 
Parulan, 387 B.R. at 171-73; In re Hernandez, 2008 WL 5441279, at *4. But see In re 
Robinette, 2007 WL 2955960 at *4; In re Martin, 371 B.R. at 353-54. 
 111 In re Rieck, 427 B.R. at 143 (finding that the debtor’s chapter 7 case should be 
dismissed for presumed abuse although debtor ineligible for chapter 13 because of high 
unsecured debt amounts); In re Hernandez, 2008 WL 5441279; In re Castle, 362 B.R. at 846; 
In re Johns, 342 B.R. at 626; see also Allard & Catanese, supra note 36. 
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in a Chapter 13 plan.112 Debtors’ CMI, however, had been significantly raised by a 
one-time union wage settlement payment received shortly before the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition.113 The debtors argued that the payment required a “special 
circumstance” adjustment to their CMI because it was non-recurring and, therefore, 
should not be used to determine what income would be available going forward to 
pay debtors’ outstanding debts.114 In addition, the inclusion of that payment skewed 
the CMI calculation significantly.115 Accordingly, the debtors argued, the means test 
did not accurately gauge their ability to pay creditors.116 Applying a strict reading of 
Section 707(b)(2)(B) and Section 101(10A) of the Code, the bankruptcy court held 
that the wage settlement payment would not be excluded from debtors’ current 
monthly income, and that their CMI could not be adjusted downward, even though 
the amount was not reflective of debtors’ future ability to repay creditors.117 The 
court reasoned that “current monthly income,” as defined by Section 101(10A) of the 
Code is a historical calculation and may not accurately represent debtor’s future 
income.118 The court noted that Congress had not chosen to expressly exclude one-
time non-recurring payments in the statutory definition of “current monthly income” 
and that the special circumstances provision could not be used to subtract from 
debtors’ CMI such a payment.119 Furthermore, the bankruptcy court held that the 
nature of the one-time non-recurring payment received by the debtors pre-petition 
was not a “special circumstance” sufficient to rebut the presumption of abuse.120 The 
court noted that the payment did not “resemble[] the examples provided in the 
statute” of what constitutes a special circumstance and that bankruptcy courts should 
not attempt to improve upon plain statutory language in order to “better carry out 
what they perceive to be the legislative purpose.”121 It should be noted that, had the 
bankruptcy court allowed the requested adjustment to debtors’ CMI based on special 
                                                            
 112 In re Cotto, 425 B.R. at 77 (presenting that with the one-time pre-petition wage 
settlement payment in the amount of $10,711.14, included in debtor’s CMI, debtors’ monthly 
disposable income was $252.50, a mere $57.50 per month above the statutory presumption of 
abuse threshold). 
 113 Id. at 74-75 (discussing that the debtor wife received a one-time union wage settlement 
in the amount of $10,711.14 less than three months before filing a joint chapter 7 bankruptcy 
petition with her spouse). 
 114 Id. at 75, 77-78. 
 115 Id. at 75. 
 116 Id. at 77-78. 
 117 Id. at 75-76. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 75-77. 
 120 Id. at 77-78 (noting that a one-time non-recurring payment is not one of the exceptions 
to “current monthly income” specifically provided by congress in § 101(10A) of the 
bankruptcy code). 
 121 Id. at 77 (“[T]he [d]ebtors’ argument that the Court should subtract a one-time payment 
from their CMI because the fact that the payment is non-recurring constitutes a ‘special 
circumstance,’ flies in the face of Congress’ clear intent to include income from all sources in 
CMI, with certain specific statutory exceptions.”). 
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circumstances, debtors would have been able to continue their bankruptcy case in 
Chapter 7 and the wage settlement payment would simply have been considered 
property of the estate to be distributed to creditors to the extent not exempted by 
applicable state or federal statute.122  
Like the court in In re Cotto, other courts have similarly refused to find that one-
time pre-petition payments are sufficient to constitute a “special circumstance” even 
while recognizing that such payments are generally of little practical significance in 
determining debtor’s capacity to repay creditors over time.123 In In re Rieck, for 
example, the court held that debtor could not obtain a special circumstance 
adjustment of his CMI when debtor voluntarily liquidated a savings bond in the six 
months before filing his bankruptcy petition.124 Debtor’s cash-out of the bond 
resulted in an increase of debtor’s CMI in an amount of $158.10 per month.125 The 
court noted that such a payment could not be characterized as a “special 
circumstance,” warranting an adjustment of debtor’s CMI amount, because it did not 
rise above the “extremely high” special circumstances standard set by Congress and 
could not be interpreted as an unexpected critical development beyond the control of 
the debtor.126  
Courts adhering to this stricter interpretation of the statutory provision have been 
similarly reluctant to find “special circumstances” where the debtor has had a change 
in employment or a change in wages close to the petition date even if those changes 
occurred in good faith.127 If debtor was earning more during the six-month look-back 
period for determining debtor’s CMI, for example, or debtor’s wages decreased 
shortly post-petition, the bankruptcy court may not allow a special circumstances 
adjustment so that the debtor’s means test will reflect this shift and more accurately 
gauge debtor’s repayment capacity.128 In the case of In re Hernandez, for example, 
                                                            
 122 See 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a) (West 2013). 
 123 In re Rieck, 427 B.R. 141, 148 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2010). 
 124 Id. at 143. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 148 (noting that “it is unlikely that a debtor’s voluntary pre-petition liquidation of 
an asset would rise above the extremely high special circumstances bar, constitute an 
unexpected development, or be interpreted as a critical event beyond the control of the debtor 
to which there is or was no alternative”). 
 127 In re Chambers, No. 10-00856-als7, 2011 WL 4479690 at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa June 7, 
2011); In re Parulan, 387 B.R. 168, 173 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008) (loss of opportunity to work 
overtime post-petition not a special circumstance because the reduction in income was not 
sufficiently “uncommon” or “unusual”); In re Hernandez, No. 08-31588, 2008 WL 5441279, 
at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Dec. 1, 2008); In re Schley, No. 08-26146-svk, 2008 WL 3895562, at 
*2 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Aug. 22, 2008). 
 128 In re Chambers, 2011 WL 4479690; In re Hernandez, 2008 WL 5441279, at *8; In re 
Schley, 2008 WL 3895562, at *8 (holding that debtor, who was an occupational therapist 
employed by a school system and paid only nine months of the year, had not established 
special circumstances requiring a downward adjustment to debtor’s CMI, or that debtor’s 
income be averaged over a twelve-month period, to account for the fact that debtor was paid 
each of the six months pre-petition because debtor had a “reasonable alternative” to only 
getting paid during the academic year such as working a summer job to supplement her 
income). 
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the debtor temporarily worked two jobs pre-petition in an effort to continue paying 
her creditors and stave-off bankruptcy.129 As a result of the extra income from the 
second job in the six months preceding the filing of the bankruptcy petition, debtor’s 
CMI put her slightly above the median income for her state and was sufficient to 
trigger the means test presumption of abuse.130 Because the debtor had two minor 
children and could not continue to work two jobs permanently, debtor argued that 
her circumstances were “special” and that the court should modify the amount of her 
CMI because it was not representative of her true financial condition or her actual 
ability to pay creditors under a Chapter 13 plan.131 Although the bankruptcy court 
recognized that “the ‘means test’s’ one-size-fits-all approach means that it is based 
only superficially on a debtor’s financial reality,” the court held that the debtor had 
not proven special circumstances.132 The court reasoned that debtor’s circumstances 
were not sufficiently special to meet the standard because the reduction in her work 
hours in order to spend more time with her children was voluntary and not 
“exceptional” or out of the ordinary in any way.133 Similarly, in In re Chambers, the 
court held that a debtor had not proven special circumstances sufficient to require an 
adjustment to debtor’s CMI where debtor alleged that he could no longer work 
overtime as he had done in the months prior to filing for bankruptcy.134 The debtor, a 
husband filing a joint bankruptcy petition with his wife, had worked large amounts 
of overtime that increased his earnings during the six months preceding the filing of 
their Chapter 7 case.135 After debtors filed their petition, the husband changed jobs 
and overtime was no longer available to him.136 Debtor testified that he now worked 
as an auto-body technician and that his wages varied because he was paid on 
commission and the amount of his pay changed depending on the amount of 
business in the shop, the number of hours he worked, and the duties he was 
assigned.137 As a result, his income post-petition was lower than when debtors filed 
for bankruptcy.138 Although the court recognized that there seemed to be a drop in 
                                                            
 129 In re Hernandez, 2008 WL 5441279, at *3. 
 130 Because debtor was working two jobs in the months preceding the filing of her 
bankruptcy petition, her annual income based on CMI was a mere $3,317.56 above the annual 
state median income for a family of her size. Without the increased income from her second 
job, debtor would have likely been subject to the safe-harbor of § 707(b)(7) of the bankruptcy 
code and, as a below-median income debtor, not subject to the means test presumption of 
abuse. 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(7) (West 2010); In re Hernandez, 2008 WL 5441279, at *2. 
 131 In re Hernandez, 2008 WL 5441279, at *3. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at*4-5 (noting that the substantive and procedural requirements of the special 
circumstances provision “make the bar extremely high for any debtor seeking to rebut the 
presumption of abuse”); see also In re Schley, 2008 WL 3895562, at *3.  
 134 In re Chambers, No. 10-00856-als7, 2011 WL 4479690, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa June 7, 
2011). 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at *1. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
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debtor’s income, the court held that cyclical or seasonal fluctuations in debtor’s 
income were insufficient to prove special circumstances and that the payment 
advices submitted by the debtor were not enough to meet the debtor’s evidentiary 
burden.139 
The ultimate result in these cases is the same: despite the fact that debtors’ 
current monthly income and, therefore, the means test calculation, does not reflect 
the debtor’s financial reality, the debtors are foreclosed from proceeding in Chapter 
7. Debtor’s only option will be to convert his case to a Chapter 13 case even when 
the debt repayment plan will result in little to no distribution to unsecured creditors 
or where a Chapter 13 case is not even a viable alternative for the debtor due to 
eligibility requirements or the inability to confirm a Chapter 13 plan.140 This result 
seems at odds with the stated congressional purpose for implementing means 
testing.141 The incongruity is most apparent in light of the United States Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Hamilton v. Lanning.142  
In Hamilton, the Court held that, to properly calculate a debtor’s “projected 
disposable income” in a Chapter 13 case, the court should make adjustments to a 
debtor’s income or expenses when the debtor has atypical fluctuations in those 
amounts close to the petition date the effect of which are to skew debtor’s CMI and 
disposable income figures.143 In the Hamilton case, the debtor had received a one-
time buyout from her former employer that “greatly inflated [debtor’s] gross 
income” for the six-month period preceding the filing of her bankruptcy petition.144 
As a result of that one-time payment, the debtor’s CMI, was $5,343.70 and her 
disposable income, based on the means test calculation, was $1,114.98.145 Debtor’s 
                                                            
 139 Id. at *4-5 (“The fact that [debtor’s] income may be subject to seasonal fluctuations is 
insufficient to show that the Debtors are unable to make payments to creditors in the amounts 
set forth [in] section 707(b).”). 
 140 In re Wise, No. 10-32441, 2011 WL 2133843 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. May 27, 2011); In re 
Burggraf, 436 B.R. 466 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010); In re Rieck, 427 B.R. 141, 143 (Bankr. D. 
Minn. 2010) (debtor ineligible for chapter 13 due to amount of unsecured debt); In re Castle, 
362 B.R. 846, 846 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006) (holding that child support payments increasing 
debtor’s pre-petition CMI were not a special circumstance even though those payments would 
be excluded from income in chapter 13 yielding a “negligible” repayment to unsecured 
creditors in a chapter 13 plan); In re Johns, 342 B.R. 626, 628-29 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 2006) 
(holding debtor could not adjust her CMI downward for income received as child support 
even though the exclusion of those payments from income in chapter 13 would yield zero 
distribution to unsecured creditors in a chapter 13 plan). 
 141 S. REP. NO. 106-49, at 3 (1999), 1999 WL 300934 (noting that the proposed reform 
legislation requires “bankruptcy judges to dismiss a chapter 7 case, or convert a chapter 7 case 
to a chapter 13 if a bankrupt has a demonstrable capacity to repay his or her debts” (emphasis 
added)); Culhane & White, supra note 2, at 671-72 (“The basic idea of the means test is to 
identify a group of higher-income debtors for special scrutiny, allow them standardized 
deductions, and then see if enough disposable income remains to fund a workable chapter 13 
plan.”). 
 142 Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010). 
 143 Id. at 2478. 
 144 Id. at 2470. 
 145 Id. 
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actual income, however, was markedly lower than what her CMI reflected.146 On 
Schedule I, the debtor reported income in the amount of $1,922 per month which 
resulted in monthly disposable income of only $149.03.147 When debtor submitted a 
debt repayment plan which proposed to pay $144 per month to unsecured creditors, 
the Chapter 13 trustee objected to the plan’s confirmation arguing that, pursuant to 
the Section 1325(b)(1)(B) of the bankruptcy code, debtor had to commit the entire 
$1,114.98 of monthly disposable income shown by the means test calculation to pay 
unsecured creditors.148 The trustee conceded that the debtor’s actual income was 
insufficient to make payments in that amount.149 The Court rejected the trustee’s 
argument and held that the decrease in debtor’s income must be considered in 
calculating debtor’s “projected disposable income” and the amount to be paid to 
unsecured creditors under the Chapter 13 plan.150 The Court noted that “[i]n cases in 
which a debtor’s disposable income during the 6-month look-back period is either 
substantially lower or higher than the debtor’s disposable income during the plan 
period, the mechanical approach would produce senseless results that we do not 
think Congress intended.”151  
The incongruity arises when one considers that, other than the special 
circumstance provision, there is no comparable mechanism in Chapter 7 through 
which a debtor can modify debtor’s income or expense amounts, similar to the 
Hamilton case, to arrive at a more accurate determination of debtor’s actual 
repayment capacity.152 As a result, an overly strict interpretation of the special 
                                                            
 146 On Schedule I, debtor reported income from her new job in the amount of $1,922 per 
month, a difference of $3,421.70 per month from the amount of her pre-petition inflated CMI 
amount. Debtor’s change in income brought her below the state-median income for her state 
of residence. Id. 
 147 Id. (noting that, based on the income that debtor would be earning at her new job minus 
her allowable expenses, debtor’s earnings were below the state median). 
 148 The chapter 13 trustee argued that the court should adopt a “mechanical approach” to 
calculate debtor’s “projected disposable income” simply taking debtor’s “disposable income,” 
as calculated on Bankruptcy Form 22C, and multiplying it by the number of months in the 
plan commitment period. The trustee asserted that debtor’s “projected disposable income” 
amount should not be adjusted for either the pre-petition one-time payment that inflated 
debtor’s CMI or the post-petition decrease in debtor’s income, that was partly due to the 
inaccurate inflation of debtor’s CMI pre-petition. Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. at 2478 (“Consistent with the text of § 1325 and pre-BAPCPA practice, we hold that 
when a bankruptcy court calculates a debtor’s projected disposable income, the court may 
account for changes in debtor’s income or expenses that are known or virtually certain at the 
time of conformation.”). 
 151 Id. at 2475-76 (noting that, if the court did not account for the inflation to debtor’s CMI 
and the decrease in her actual income, the debtor could not file a confirmable plan pursuant to 
§ 1325(a)(6) of the bankruptcy code because she would not be able to “make all payments 
under the plan and comply with the plan”). 
 152 In re Wise, No. 10-32441, 2011 WL 2133843, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. May 27, 2011) 
(noting that there is no provision in chapter 7 through which the court could account for 
“known or virtually certain information about the debtor’s future income or expenses” as in 
Hamilton v. Lanning); In re Littman, 370 B.R. 820, 829 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007) (noting that 
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circumstance provision denies the debtor of the only procedural safeguard protecting 
him from the absurd results that the means test calculation sometimes yields.153 If 
Hamilton v. Lanning had been a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case as opposed to a Chapter 
13 case, for example, a bankruptcy court undertaking a strict interpretation of the 
special circumstance provision may not have considered the one-time proceeds 
received by the debtor pre-petition sufficient to constitute a special circumstance 
requiring modification of the debtor’s CMI. Such was the situation in the In re Cotto 
and In re Rieck Chapter 7 cases where the debtors could not prove special 
circumstances despite the inflation of debtors’ CMI due to a one-time pre-petition 
payment.154 As a result, a debtor unable to proceed in Chapter 7 because of means 
testing may ultimately convert his bankruptcy case to a Chapter 13 only to find that, 
once his income or expenses are adjusted as per the Court’s opinion in Lanning, the 
distribution to creditors will be minimal or debtor may be unable to produce a 
confirmable debt repayment plan.155 Moreover, in some cases, because the means 
test calculation may overestimate the amount of disposable income that debtor would 
have available to pay unsecured creditors in a Chapter 13 case, the debtor may 
successfully confirm a Chapter 13 plan only to find that he cannot maintain his 
current plan payments.156 If the debtor cannot make the required monthly payments 
under the Chapter 13 plan, the United States Trustee will file a motion to dismiss 
debtor’s bankruptcy case or convert the case to a Chapter 7 case.157 The courts are 
split on whether the means test applies to cases that are converted from Chapter 13 to 
Chapter 7.158 Accordingly, in jurisdictions where means testing applies, the debtor 
                                                            
the means test “does not contain any provision which permits a court to review the debtors’ 
actual finances”). 
 153 In re Littman, 370 B.R. at 829 (stating that the means test “snapshot approach” is 
“capable of reaching conclusions about a debtor’s ability to pay divorced from reality and 
potentially at odds with Congress’ professed intent”); In re Johns, 342 B.R. 626, 628-29 
(Bankr. E.D. Okla. 2006) (holding that amounts received by debtor as child support could not 
be excluded from debtor’s CMI as special circumstance even when if debtor converted the 
case to a chapter 13 case, the distribution to general unsecured creditors would be zero). 
 154 In re Cotto, 425 B.R. 72, 74-75 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Rieck, 427 B.R. 141, 143 
(Bankr. D. Minn. 2010). 
 155 In re Wise, 2011 WL 2133843; In re Castle, 362 B.R. 846, 846 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 
2006); In re Johns, 342 B.R. at 628-29. 
 156 See generally Murphy & Dion, supra note 20, at 416-17 (“[I]t is often the case that the 
debtors will fall behind on their chapter 13 bankruptcy payments.”). 
 157 11 U.S.C.A. § 1307(c)(6) (West 2010) (allowing conversion of a chapter 13 case to 
chapter 7 or dismissal of the bankruptcy case by the United States Trustee for “material 
default by the debtor with respect to a term of a confirmed plan”). 
 158 In re Chapman, 447 B.R. 250 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2011); In re Willis, 408 B.R. 803, 806 
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2009) (recognizing that courts are split on the issue of whether means 
testing should apply in cases converted to chapter 7); In re Sullivan, 370 B.R. 314 (Bankr. D. 
Mont. 2007) (holding case converted from a chapter 13 to a chapter 7 must be dismissed for 
presumed abuse where debtor’s means test calculation showed sufficient disposable income 
and debtors did not rebut the presumption of abuse through showing of special 
circumstances). See generally Murphy & Dion, supra note 20, (“Courts have not been 
consistent . . . regarding whether a means test is required when a debtor seeks to convert a 
case from chapter 13 to chapter 7.”). 
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may be foreclosed from obtaining bankruptcy relief at all—unable to consummate a 
Chapter 13 plan and unable to proceed in Chapter 7 due to means testing and the 
presumption of abuse.159 
B. Adjustments to Allowable Expenses 
A debtor needing a modification in the type or amount of expenses allowed on 
the means test will likely encounter an even greater challenge when attempting to 
prove special circumstances. Bankruptcy courts undertaking a narrow interpretation 
of Section 707(b)(2)(B) will generally not allow a debtor to deduct, as part of 
debtor’s means test calculation, any expenses outside of those expressly provided for 
in Section 707(b)(2)(A)(ii) and will rarely allow a debtor an upward modification of 
those allowable expenses.160 This is particularly true where a debtor has incurred the 
expense voluntarily or has willingly undertaken the actions that caused or created the 
need for the particular expense.161 This may include debtors that have changed jobs 
or relocated and, therefore, have higher transportation expenses than those permitted 
by the standard deduction due to longer commutes.162 Bankruptcy courts have been 
slightly more inclined to find that debtor’s circumstances are “special” in situations 
where the expense in question is created by the birth of a child or for the benefit of 
                                                            
 159 In re Willis, 408 B.R. at 810 (stating that there are two “release valves” that will prevent 
a debtor from being caught in an endless cycle of failure in chapter 13 and threatened 
dismissal in chapter 7: (1) the United States Trustee can exercise its discretion and not pursue 
dismissal; or (2) the debtor may rebut the presumption of abuse by showing special 
circumstances). 
 160 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I)-(V) (West 2010). 
 161 In re Pignotti, No. 07-04109-lmj7, 2011 WL 1299616 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 2011) (finding 
no special circumstances where additional transportation expense was undertaken voluntarily 
by debtor when debtor chose to move a substantial distance away from work); In re Shinkle, 
382 B.R. 85, 89 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2008) (holding debtors did not prove special circumstances 
allowing debtors an increase of their housing expense when debtors voluntarily chose to 
remain in their current home rather than relocate to a smaller home); In re Burggraf, 436 B.R. 
466, 466 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010) (noting that, when it comes to expenses as special 
circumstances, courts taking a stricter approach focus on the voluntariness of the situation that 
caused the expense and are unlikely to allow a special circumstance adjustment where the 
debtor has any degree of choice over whether to incur the expense); In re Tuss, 360 B.R. 684, 
700-01 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2007) (holding that additional expenses incurred by debtor for food 
and personal care while traveling extensively for work was not a special circumstance because 
debtor did not prove that the expenses were circumstances beyond his control since debtor 
could prepare his meals at his place of lodging and, therefore, reduce these expenses); In re 
Tranmer, 355 B.R. 234, 251 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2006) (holding that debtor’s increased gas and 
other transportation costs due to long commute to work was not a special circumstance where 
debtor chose not to relocate and, therefore, could not prove costs were “beyond debtor’s 
reasonable control”).  
 162 In re Pignotti, 2011 WL 1299616, at *3; In re Tuss, 360 B.R. at 700-01; In re Sparks, 
360 B.R. 224, 230-31 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2006) (finding no special circumstances when, 
among other expense adjustments requested, debtor claimed an increase transportation 
expense because he had to travel forty miles round-trip to work); In re Tranmer, 355 B.R. at 
251. But see In re Batzkiel, 349 B.R. 581, 586-87 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2006) (allowing debtor 
special circumstance modification of transportation expense arising from long commutes of 
debtor and spouse to work).  
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dependents that are minors, but, in these cases, debtors must take care to thoroughly 
document all additional expenses and specifically tie those expenses to the claimed 
special circumstance.163  
The rift between bankruptcy courts applying a narrow interpretation of the 
special circumstances provision and those undertaking a broader approach to this 
Section is most apparent in the courts’ treatment of student loan payments and 
whether to allow those payments as a special circumstance expense on the means test 
calculation.164 The means test does not expressly include student loan repayment as 
an allowable expense.165 Accordingly, debtors wanting to reflect those payments as 
an expense in the means test calculation to more accurately reflect their real 
repayment capacity must establish that student loan repayment constitutes a “special 
circumstance.”166 These arguments are usually premised upon the fact that student 
loans are not dischargeable in bankruptcy and that, therefore, the debtor has “no 
reasonable alternative” other than to make those payments.167 A debtor that is not 
able to deduct his student loan payments as an expense on the means test calculation 
may have to convert his bankruptcy to a Chapter 13 case where debtor will either 
have to pay his loan in one lump sum or make payments on the student loan through 
the Chapter 13 plan.168 The former option is impossible for the majority of debtors 
                                                            
 163 In re Willis, 408 B.R. at 810-11 (holding additional childcare expense was not a special 
circumstance because debtor failed to proffer sufficient evidence of why expense was 
“reasonable and necessary” and failed to provide documentary evidence); In re Littman, 370 
B.R. 820, 830-33 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007) (holding that a child support obligation that became 
final post-petition was a special circumstance allowing debtor an expense adjustment on the 
means test); In re Sullivan, 370 B.R. 314 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2007); In re Pampas, 369 B.R. 290 
(Bankr. M.D. La. 2007); In re Graham, 363 B.R. 844 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2007). 
 164 In re Burggraf, 436 B.R. 466; In re Champagne, 389 B.R. 191, 198-99 (Bankr. D. Kan. 
2008) (recognizing the disagreement among bankruptcy courts about the focus of the special 
circumstances inquiry in student loan cases—i.e. whether the inquiry should focus on the 
characteristics of the student loans and resulting economic hardship or whether the inquiry 
should focus on the circumstances under which the debtor incurred the obligation).  
 165 Student loan payments cannot be deducted as “Other Necessary Expenses,” because § 
707(b)(2)(A) of the code expressly excludes “payments for debts” from being a qualified 
expense deduction. 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (West 2013). See generally Anthony P. 
Cali, The “Special Circumstance” of Student Loan Debt Under the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 473, 473 (2010) 
(“Whether by design or oversight, Congress failed to include student loan repayment as an 
express, allowable expense in the means test.”). 
 166 Cali, supra note 165, at 476 (noting that Congress’ failure to include student loan 
repayment in the statutorily defined expenses “has the effect of making the means test 
inaccurate for those with legitimate student loan repayment expenses”).  
 167 Section 523(a)(8) of the bankruptcy code makes student loans non-dischargeable unless 
the debtor can prove that excepting the debt from discharge would impose an “undue hardship 
on debtor.” Proving “undue hardship” for a debtor is extremely difficult and such exclusions 
from discharge are rarely granted. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(8) (West 2010). See generally Cali, 
supra note 165, at 478-79 (“In interpreting the undue hardship standard, most courts have set 
the bar for dischargeability fairly high. As a result, student loan debt is extremely difficult to 
discharge in bankruptcy proceedings.”). 
 168 Cali, supra note 165, at 497-500.  
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while the latter option will often leave the debtor with more debt at the completion of 
the Chapter 13 plan as a result of accrued interest on the loans.169 Such a scenario 
would effectively deny the debtor a chance at a “fresh start” even when the debtor 
has made all the required payments under the plan.170  
Courts undertaking a strict interpretation of Section 707(b)(2)(B) have 
overwhelmingly held, with very few exceptions, that such an expense is not a 
“special circumstance.”171 These courts have taken two distinct approaches: Some 
consistently hold that student loan payments are never “special” enough to fall 
within the exception because these expenses are of the type normally encountered by 
most debtors and are, therefore, not “highly unusual.”172 A larger subset of these 
courts has held, however, that student loan payments could conceivably meet the 
standard depending on the circumstances that led the debtor to acquire the student 
loan debt.173 These courts have emphasized that it is not the obligation to repay the 
loan itself and its non-dischargeability in bankruptcy that qualifies such an expense 
as a special circumstance, but rather the reasons why the loan was acquired that must 
be considered to be “special.”174 Student loan obligations incurred by the debtor in 
the regular course of obtaining an education, therefore, are generally deemed entirely 
too common to meet the high special circumstances threshold set by these courts.175 
                                                            
 169 See generally id.; see also In re Delbecq, 368 B.R. 754, 759 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2007). 
 170 See generally Cali, supra note 165, 497-500. 
 171 In re Edwards, No. 12-00603-TOM-7, 2012 WL 3042233 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. July 25, 
2012) (holding that two school principals could not deduct their student loan payments as an 
expense on the means test when the loans were acquired to finance their undergraduate, 
masters, and doctoral degrees); In re Burggraf, 436 B.R. 466 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010); In re 
Hammock, 436 B.R. 343, 355-56 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2010) (holding that debtor that acquired 
student loan debt to obtain degree and secure her position with her employer amidst a 
corporate restructuring did not prove special circumstances); In re Pageau, 383 B.R. 221 
(Bankr. D.N.H. 2008) (noting that student loans incurred solely to secure more advantageous 
income or different vocation are not special circumstances). 
 172 In re Sanders, 454 B.R. 855, 857 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 2011) (recognizing the division 
among the bankruptcy courts on this issue and noting that, for some courts, “the expense 
ultimately needs to be the result of [a] situation that is extraordinary, outside the control of a 
debtor, or always unanticipated”); In re Martellaro, 404 B.R. 548, 562 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2008) 
(“[S]tudent loan debt among bankruptcy debtors is a common and ordinary circumstance, not 
a ‘special’ circumstance.”); In re Vaccariello, 375 B.R. 809, 816 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007) 
(“[F]unding higher education through the use of student loans is becoming ubiquitous. It 
cannot be argued that having a student loan is rare or unusual; therefore, Debtors’ obligation 
to repay their student loans, standing alone, cannot constitute special circumstances.”).  
 173 In re Edwards, 2012 WL 3042233, at *5-6 (noting that, even applying a strict 
construction of the statute, student loan payments may constitute special circumstances 
depending on the facts of each case); In re Champagne, 389 B.R. 191, 200 (Bankr. D. Kan. 
2008) (“The circumstances which gave rise to the loan are an important, if not the 
determinative, factor.”)  
 174 In re Pageau, 383 B.R. 221, 228 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2008); In re Hammock, 436 B.R. 343 
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2010) (student loan payment was not special circumstance merely because 
the obligation was non-dischargeable); In re Champagne, 389 B.R. at 200.  
 175 In re Edwards, 2012 WL 3042233, at *6-7 (holding that two school principals could not 
deduct their student loan payments as an expense on the means test when the loans were 
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Only when the obligation was incurred by the debtor in order to learn a new trade 
due to some unforeseen injury, disability, or similar unexpected situation will the 
court find that the debtor has proven “special circumstances”.176 Some courts also 
seem to consider whether the amount of student loan debt amassed by the debtor is 
significant and whether a totality of the circumstances show that debtor did not 
attempt to mitigate his expenses overall, including the amount of student loan debt 
acquired, pre-petition.177 One court noted that student loan payments will not 
constitute a special circumstance where “the debtors have not made an effort to live 
more modestly or have not made financial sacrifices in an effort to repay their debts 
on their own or through a Chapter 13 case.”178 
Bankruptcy courts adhering to a broader reading of the special circumstances 
provision take a more moderate and better-reasoned approach, allowing the debtor a 
special circumstance expense adjustment for student loan payments. These courts 
will generally hold that student loan payments are a special circumstance because the 
obligation is non-dischargeable and the debtor has “no reasonable alternative” other 
than to make those payments.179 The courts have reasoned that allowing for this 
                                                            
acquired to finance their undergraduate, masters, and doctoral degrees); In re Carrillo, 421 
B.R. 540 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009) (repayment of student loan obligation not a special 
circumstance where debtors incurred the debt in the ordinary course of obtaining their college 
education); In re Pageau, 383 B.R. 221 (student loan payment not a special circumstance 
when incurred in the ordinary course of acquiring education). 
 176 In re Harmon, 446 B.R. 721, 730 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011) (holding that student loan 
payments were not a special circumstance because there was no evidence that debtor incurred 
the educational expenses due to a life adversity such as “a job loss or disability”); In re 
Johnson, 446 B.R. 921, 924-25 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2011) (holding that debtor who acquired 
student loans to obtain law degree because debtor’s increasing weight had made her career as 
a nurse more difficult, did not prove special circumstances); In re Siler, 426 B.R. 167 (Bankr. 
W.D.N.C. 2010) (repayment on student loan obligation not a special circumstance absent 
evidence to indicate that loan was necessitated by some unforeseen injury, disability, or the 
like); In re Pageau, 383 B.R. 221 (noting that student loan payments could be a special 
circumstance where events leading to the acquisition of obligation are outside debtor’s control 
such as when further education is necessitated by permanent injury, disability, or an employer 
closing debtor’s place of employment); In re Womer, 427 B.R. 334, 336 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 
2010) (student loan payments not a special circumstance without a more significant 
explanation by debtors as to how the loan debt would have “grave consequences” for them 
going forward). 
 177 In re Edwards, 2012 WL 3042233, at *7 (holding that student loans were not special 
circumstances where the debtors borrowed funds in excess of the value of their home and 
incurred debts for two motor vehicles while knowing they had substantial student loan debt). 
 178 Id. 
 179 In re Martin, 371 B.R. 347, 356 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007); In re Delbecq, 368 B.R. 754, 
759 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2007) (holding that student loan was special circumstance because the 
obligation was non-dischargeable and deferring payment of the loan was not a “reasonable 
alternative”); In re Haman, 366 B.R. 307, 315 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (holding that student 
loan was special circumstance because the only way debtor could stop paying the obligation 
was to pay it in full which was impossible based on debtor’s finances); In re Templeton, 365 
B.R. 213, 216 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 2007) (holding that debtors’ non-dischargeable student loan 
obligations were a special circumstance because debtors were not eligible for consolidation or 
deferment of the loans and there was no other course of action they could take “to reduce or 
otherwise avoid the additional expense of the student loans”). 
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expense more accurately gauges debtor’s true repayment capacity and avoids leaving 
the debtor in a worse financial position at the end of a Chapter 13 plan.180 In In re 
Delbecq, for example, the court held that debtor’s student loan payments were a 
special circumstance that required an expense adjustment on debtor’s means test.181 
The court noted that allowing such an adjustment in the amount of debtor’s student 
loan payment clearly showed that debtor did not have “a meaningful ability to pay 
her debts.”182 The court reasoned that debtor had “no reasonable alternative” to 
making these payments because the obligation was non-dischargeable and deferring 
the loans, if debtor’s case was dismissed for presumed abuse, would have required 
debtor to incur additional debt in the form of interest payments.183 The court also 
noted that under a Chapter 13 plan, the debtor’s plan would likely not provide a 
distribution to unsecured creditors, but would instead provide only for the ongoing 
payment of debtor’s student loan.184 In such a situation, given the costs of 
administering a Chapter 13 case, the student loan payments that debtor would make 
pursuant to the Chapter 13 plan would be less than what the debtor was currently 
paying.185 Accordingly, the debtor would find herself in a worse position financially 
at the end of the hypothetical Chapter 13 case.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Bankruptcy courts taking a more moderate approach to the interpretation of 
Section 707(b)(2)(B) of the bankruptcy code present a better-reasoned analysis of the 
special circumstance provision. This interpretation produces results more in line with 
Congress’ reasons for implementing means testing and is truer to the statute’s plain 
statutory language. The heighted “exceptional circumstance” standard being used by 
some bankruptcy courts, effectively denies consumer debtors the only procedural 
safeguard that can protect them from a means test calculation that is flawed and that, 
at times, does not accurately reflect debtor’s capacity to repay creditors. For some 
debtors, this means that they are unfairly denied the ability to continue their case in 
Chapter 7 and obtain a discharge that will give them a fresh financial start. Those 
debtors that choose to convert their bankruptcy to a Chapter 13 case will have their 
“fresh start” delayed for five years until the completion of the debt repayment plan. 
For some of these debtors, those with student loans for example, the consummation 
of the Chapter 13 plan may leave them in a worse financial position than where 
debtors found themselves at the start of the bankruptcy case. Still for other debtors, 
                                                            
 180 In re Martin, 371 B.R. at 356 (holding that a chapter 13 case was not a reasonable 
alternative for the debtor because it would result in only a partial payment of the student loan 
during the term of the plan and a substantial balance would likely still be due upon completion 
of the chapter 13 case); In re Delbecq, 368 B.R. at 759.  
 181 In re Delbecq, 368 B.R. at 759. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. (noting that the debtor would incur additional debt in the form of interest payments 
at a rate of nine percent in order to pay off her other unsecured debts). 
 184 Id. (“In this jurisdiction, the Court has historically allowed debtors to classify separately 
student loan indebtedness pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5).”). 
 185 Id. at 760 (stating that under the circumstances, “the only parties who [stood] to benefit 
from conversion [were] Debtor’s attorney and the Chapter 13 trustee”). 
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the impossibility of being able to prove “special circumstances” may mean that they 
will be in a proverbial catch-22—unable to obtain a discharge in Chapter 13 because 
of their inability to fund a plan or sustain plan payments and unable to obtain 
bankruptcy relief in Chapter 7 because of the means test presumption of abuse. In 
those cases, the debtor will find himself at the mercy of the United States Trustee’s 
discretion to not pursue dismissal of debtor’s bankruptcy case. These results cannot 
be what Congress intended when it implemented means testing and included the 
special circumstance provision in that test as a safeguard for debtors.  
Accordingly, bankruptcy courts should adhere to the more moderate 
interpretation of the statute when determining whether the circumstances alleged by 
debtor to be “special” are in fact special enough to rebut the abuse presumption. 
Doing so would not require that the court simply allow any modification of CMI or 
expenses sought by the debtor. Instead, the court should undertake a fact-specific 
inquiry to determine whether the circumstance asserted by the debtor is one that is 
out of the ordinary and one that leaves the debtor with no reasonable alternative but 
to modify his income or expenses. Where a demonstrable economic unfairness 
would result to the debtor if those changes were not reflected in the means test 
calculation, the court should allow the debtor a special circumstance modification. If 
that modification is sufficient to bring the debtor’s disposable income figure below 
the statutory threshold, and debtor has the necessary documentary evidence to prove 
the need for the change, debtor will have rebutted the presumption of abuse.  
There is no merit to the argument that a standard requiring anything less than 
extraordinary circumstances would, in effect, “eviscerate[] the means test 
calculation” or require a “subjective judge-driven ‘smell test’” in every Chapter 7 
case.186 Special circumstance adjustments are only sought in a small percentage of 
bankruptcy cases. Moreover, even a moderate interpretation of Section 707(b)(2)(B), 
would still require a debtor seeking the protection of this safeguard to meet multiple 
procedural and substantive burdens. Bankruptcy courts could not disregard the 
means test and use their unfettered discretion to determine whether a debtor, in fact, 
has the ability to pay creditors. Debtors seeking a special circumstance adjustment to 
the means test would still have to prove that there were circumstances outside of 
those that are common for the average debtor, that had financial impact on either 
debtor’s income or expenses, and that are not reflected in the means test calculation. 
Furthermore, those adjustments must still be sufficient to bring the debtor’s 
disposable income below the statutory threshold amount. While such an 
interpretation would, in limited cases, introduce some judicial discretion into the 
means test, the exercise of that discretion could effectively reduce or eliminate the 
incongruent results that a strict interpretation of the provision creates. The fact that 
the means test incorporates a special circumstance provision at all, shows that 
Congress intended to preserve the ability of bankruptcy courts to exercise some 
discretion in cases where debtor’s current monthly income or expenses do not fit 
neatly into the means test calculation.  
Similarly, a moderate interpretation of the statute would not make it more likely 
that debtors could easily circumvent the means test through careful bankruptcy 
                                                            
 186 In re Cribbs, 387 B.R. 324, 329 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2008) (“[T]he ‘meaningful ability to 
repay’ standard for finding that there are ‘special circumstances’ eviscerates the means test 
calculation by reintroducing, in every case, a more subjective judge-driven ‘smell test’ to 
decide whether debtors can afford to repay.”). 
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planning or manipulation of debtor’s pre-petition income or expenses. The statute 
requires detailed documentary proof of the circumstance that debtor claims is 
“special” and of the financial impact attendant to that circumstance. Furthermore, 
one must note that while a consumer debtor only has one procedural safeguard from 
the inequities of means testing—the United States Trustee has three separate and 
distinct grounds pursuant to which it can seek dismissal of debtor’s Chapter 7 
bankruptcy case for abuse. In cases where the facts indicate the possible 
manipulation of income or expenses on the part of the debtor, the United States 
Trustee may still seek dismissal of debtor’s case based on “bad faith” or if a totality 
of the circumstances of the debtor’s financial situation indicate abuse.187 The fact 
that only a small percentage of debtors may ultimately be affected by how strictly 
the courts construe this provision is irrelevant. For those honest debtors that are 
inequitably denied Chapter 7 relief, the decision is critical. 
Accordingly, to function as the safeguard that Congress intended and aid in 
avoiding some of the absurd results produced by means testing, the special 
circumstances provision should be interpreted to require the debtor to prove exactly 
that - circumstances that are “special” and not necessarily circumstances that are 
extraordinary, involuntary, or wholly out of debtor’s control. 
                                                            
 187 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(3) (West 2010). 
34https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss4/6
